Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

Indictment Against Noriega Called 'Circus'

FL051540 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1345 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] We are waiting for a direct connection via satellite with Panama. Attention Panama National Radio: Good morning.

[(Posada)] This is Panama. At this time Panama National Radio, in network with a number of other radio stations in the country, is giving the platform to government spokesmen who are saying the U.S. State Department's charges against General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander in chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces, are a circus performance.

Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Abadia Arias himself said it is all a circus, a staged show, so the United States can retain its military presence here in this country after the year 2000.

Diverse reactions have occurred within the last few hours here in Panama in reference to the accusations made against Gen Noriega. The charges made by a grand jury in Miami are being called defamatory. There is still no condemnation. [sentence as heard] It is just a common group of U.S. citizens who have been summoned and have a 30-page file of testimony from people who are supposedly close to Gen Noriega.

For example, the daily CRITICA reports that Jose Isabel Blandon, former consul in New York, was paid a considerable amount of money—probably by the CIA—to testify against Gen Noriega.

Panama is quiet at this time. Everything is normal. Nevertheless, the self-proclaimed Civic Crusade, taking refuge in the Chamber of Commerce groups, the CONEP [National Council of Private Enterprise], the CAPAC [Panamanian Chamber of Construction], has reiterated its call for a national strike within the next few hours, which will initially last half an hour and then will be extended to a general strike including other economic sectors.

Nevertheless, the popular and progressive forces, such as the National Council of Organized Workers, CONATO, which includes the majority of this country's workers, and the National Federation of Public Employees, FENACEFE, which has more than 130,000 state employees, have closed ranks behind Gen Noriega and they have reiterated their support.

It is likely that within the next few days the people will organize to express support for the commander in chief of Panama's Defense Forces.

Finally, one must say in this report that government spokesmen have said, reiterated, that if they slandered Torrijos, if they insulted Torrijos, they are now doing it to Gen Noriega and they have absolutely no proof whatsoever for all the accusations they made against him.

Let's listen to the statements by legislator Rigoberto Pared.

[Begin Pared recording, in progress] ...the United States. As Carter was debating the treaty in the United States, Reagan was campaigning for funds to combat what he called Carter's gift of the canal to the Panamanians. We see today how arrogance is increasing the attacks and actions against Panama.

The U.S. State Department and those here who want power without going to the polls are in for a surprise because Panama will not give in. Panama will resist and the Defense Forces will not split up. Gen Noriega will not resign his command because he knows and is aware that he represents the cornerstone that supports the building. [end recording]

[(Posada)] That is a synthesis of the position, opinion of the government spokesmen in reference to the current situation in Panama.

Reporting from National Radio, (Jairo Posada), for Cuba.

This information, friends, that journalist Marilena Alonso was able to obtain from (Jairo Posada) from Panama's National Radio is very interesting. This new script that the highest-ranking officers of the U.S. Government have produced against Gen Noriega is certainly the main topic of the U.S. press today throughout that nation. All Miami newspapers are carrying on their front pages this indictment against Noriega for drug trafficking. It is truly a grotesque show put on by the United States to try and discredit, destroy, the image of Gen Noriega in this destabilizing campaign that is being carried out against him and against the Panamanian people in general in its attempt to not transfer the Panama Canal in the year 2000 in accordance with the Torrijos-Carter Treaties.

Contra Aid Rejection: 'Political Defeat'

FL041507 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1116 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] U.S. President Ronald Reagan suffered a serious political defeat when Congress voted against his request for $36.2 million in continued military aid to the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries with 219 votes against and 211 in favor.

The decision by the House of Representatives supposedly puts an end to Reagan's policy to aid the contras since he said at the end of 1987 that if Congress rejected his proposal, he would not request more aid in 1988, his last year in office.

Nevertheless, White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater made no comment when asked by the press if Reagan would keep his word. However, he did admit that the President could approach private sources as was done from 1984 to 1986 when Congress prohibited further aid to the contras.

The United States has provided the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries with approximately $200 million in military aid since 1981 while the CIA continues supervising the supply of war materials. In Managua, the government received the defeat of Reagan's request with prudent satisfaction. President Daniel Ortega will make a statement on the matter within the next few hours.

Carlos Tunnermann, Nicaraguan ambassador to Washington, said the House's decision reflects the opinion of the majority of the U.S. people who oppose the continuation of Reagan's war policy and support Central American peace efforts.

The House's rejection of further aid to the Contras eliminated the possibility of discussing the matter today in the Senate.

For his part, contra leader Adolfo Calero expressed his dissatisfaction with the House's decision, but he said the White House is not willing to abandon those who Reagan calls defenders of democracy.

Talks in Luanda Discuss Troop Withdrawal

FL041412 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Under the title "What Would Be the Essence of a Negotiated Solution to the Problems of Angola and Namibia?," GRANMA newspaper today publishes a note in reference to the recent talks in Luanda on this matter.

A round of talks between Angola and Cuba was held just a week ago in that capital and a joint delegation was created with U.S. representatives. Certain advances were made that are encouraging in the continued search for a political solution.

Angola stated the indispensable conditions for a just and honorable agreement during these recent talks. These conditions are:

An end to foreign intervention in domestic affairs which is currently given by the United States and South Africa in the form of logistical aid to the counterrevolutionary UNITA [National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola] bands and which is used to sow terror and death in defenseless villages and destroy the country's economy;

The withdrawal of South African forces which systematically raid the extensive southern-southeastern part of Angola;

Another indispensable condition stated by Angola is the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 ending the illegal occupation of Namibia by the troops of Pretoria and allowing for the independence of the last colony on the continent, for which its people have struggled for many years under the leadership of the SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization];

To achieve a just and honorable agreement, Angola also stated the need for international guarantees which would insure that new aggressions against that People's Republic would not be repeated.

If an agreement is reached based on these conditions, GRANMA reports, Angola and Cuba are ready to implement a schedule for the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist military contingent until our combatants are totally repatriated.

This clear, objective, and just position is based on international law, the UN Charter, and several Security Council resolutions. A solution of this nature would meet with the satisfaction of all the peoples of Africa and the world.

GRANMA continues, the solution now primarily depends on the attitude adopted by the U.S. Government, which is acting as mediator in the negotiations in areas that concern it, in connection with noninterference in Angola's domestic affairs. It also depends on the firmness with which the United States supports the idea of the political solution in which it has said it is extremely interested.

South Africa would not be able to challenge the entire world community if the United States would join the unanimous demand for the application of UN Resolution 435.

In addition to the force of the law, there are deeds, and South Africa is risking a total failure in its military adventure in Angola, which could be the swan song for the hateful apartheid regime. That is to say, it would have to accede to more than what is now being proposed for a negotiated solution.

Although short, the talks in Luanda were serious and are an important advance. U.S. authorities have publicly expressed their satisfaction with the results.

A solution in a relatively short time is really objectively possible, ends the note published today by GRANMA.

Government Participates

FL042105 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 30 Jan 88

[Text] A new round of Angolan-U.S. talks has ended in Luanda. The meeting was held within the framework of the efforts being made by the African country to achieve peace and stability in the region. A representative of the Cuban Government was part of the Angolan delegation in the negotiations. The parties expressed their views and agreed to continue the talks.

Human Rights Group Ends Hunger Strike

FL031150 Bonaire Trans World Radio in English 1130 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] A human rights group says its members in Cuba have ended a 3-day hunger strike called to protest conditions there. The group said its members will carry out other actions in the coming weeks.

'Wide Angle' Program Views Armando Valladares

FL020550 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 2 Feb 88

["Wide Angle" program hosted by Pedro Martinez Pirez; participants identified by video caption]

[Text] [Martinez] In tonight's "Wide Angle" program we will try to answer several questions: Who is the new head of the U.S. delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva? Why was he in jail for over 20 years in Cuba? How did the trial in which he and other terrorists were convicted and sanctioned by Cuban courts develop? Who participated in those trials and who were the defense attorneys? What do some of the people who were his neighbors here in Havana or who worked with him in the Postal Savings Box of the Communications Ministry, or who lived with him in the Cuban jail, and even those who took steps in favor of freeing him think of him? Why did the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, give him U.S. citizenship so quickly and, on 3 December of last year, appoint him as head of the U.S. delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva?

In this "Wide Angle" program we will have Cuban and foreign guests. However, let us begin with an August 1987 French news agency cable.

[Unidentified narrator] Washington, 11 August, AFP—President Ronald Reagan appointed on Tuesday a former political prisoner, Cuban dissident writer Armando Valladares, as U.S. representative to the Human Rights Commission of the UN Economic and Social Council, the White House reported. Valladares, who replaces Robert Wallace in that position, is presently president of the European Coalition for Human Rights in Cuba, is the author of the book "From My Wheelchair," and has been called a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. He was born in Pinar del Rio in May 1937 and currently lives in Florida.

[Martinez] Although the international agency cable is only 12-lines-long, it contains phrases such as: former political prisoner, dissident, writer, the title "From My Wheelchair," and Amnesty International's reference to Mr Valladares as a prisoner of conscience.

[Narrator] On the recommendation of the murderer Orlando Piedra, Valladares enlisted in the police forces of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship in October 1957. Seven months later the current U.S. ambassador, Armando Fernando Valladares Perez, was promoted to first class policeman. [Video shows photograph of young Valladares in uniform. Caption reads: "Armando Valladares: Political Prisoner? Identification and records of Valladares as a young man when he allegedly was member of the police during Batista's regime." Video then cuts to show photographs of Orlando Piedra with caption reading: "Orlando Piedra Negueruela, 1917. Joined National Police on 8 May, 1952 as a captain, first class. Through a Dictator Batista decree, he was promoted to commander and lieutenant colonel the same day he joined the police. The following day, he was appointed supervisor of the dreaded Investigations Bureau, and 2 months later, 4 July 1952, he was promoted to colonel, first class. On the same day, he was named supervisor of the police corps. On 11 April, 1954, he was promoted to chief of the Investigations Bureau."]

[Martinez] During the 15 years he served in the repressive corps of the Batista tyranny, policeman Armando Valladares became a moral accomplice to various crimes committed in Havana.

[Narrator] The Catholic teacher, Esther Lina Milanez Dantin, was brutally tortured by policemen who in her presence also tortured young Colombian-born Enrique Zamorano. Carlos Bastida Arguello, Ecuadoran journalist, was murdered by the police as reprisal for having visited Sierra Maestra on a professional mission. Sisters Maria Cristina and Lourdes Giral Abreu were machinegunned by the police. The political prisoners were riddled with bullets in their cells at Castillo del Principe. Vicente Ponce Carrazco and Reynaldo Gutierrez Otano died in the police assault. Lydia Doce and Clodomira Ferrals were murdered next to four young men of the Regla neighborhood persecuted by the police. The henchmen attacked a house and killed Angel Ameijeiras and four other revolutionaries who were with him. Eleven youths were found dead in front of police station No 15.

[Martinez] None of those crimes moved the then policeman Armando Valladares, who is today the magnificent president of the European Coalition for Human Rights in Cuba and was just named by President Ronald Reagan representative to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

Betancourt, Mr Armando Valladares asserts there have been a number of forgeries during his life, regarding his enrollment in the police and his birth certificate; he involves you—as a journalist—in those forgeries. What can you tell us?

[Luis Adrian Betancourt] I can tell you it is true: Mr Armando Valladares' whole life is full of forgeries. His life itself is a lie. It is a legend created by the U.S. intelligence community to make of him a dissident, and to make him a kind of legend. To turn a henchman of the dictatorship into a writer naturally requires forgeries. In his book, "Against All Hope," he refers to a photograph that is cut out in the place his birth date is written. This must have been due to human error. Here is, I believe, the original. There is no reason to hide that date. It is complete here, for example. We also have here a copy of the birth certificate he presented when he enrolled in the police, and where you can see an obvious forgery of the year of his birth, and the inscription such as it shows in the books of the civil registry of Pinar del Rio which shows 1937—which is when he was born.

[Martinez] Why 1936? What is the reason of that forgery according to Valladares?

[Betancourt] Valladares says we have made up these documents. However, in reality, this is his police file. He used this to be able to get into the police force. An uncle of his who worked in the Bureau of Investigations speaks [words indistinct] Orlando Piedra and Orlando Piedra is the one whose signature is at the corner of his file, as well as as well as on another page of his file; he sponsored him in the organization. Since he was not old enough, he simply made this change on the date.

[Martinez] That means that Valladares himself knew about it and it was done for his own benefit.

[Betancourt] He probably did it himself. As a matter of fact, the very first job he had was making police identifications, before belonging to a special company in a [word indistinct] to which he transferred later.

[Martinez] Therefore, is it Orlando Piedra who helped him get into the police force?

[Betancourt] The former henchman, chief of the Bureau of Investigations, noted and known murderer who is in Miami, is the man who sponsored him in the police force, and that is why he was able to enroll in it.

[Martinez] Valladares recently denied in Indianapolis having belonged to the police. With regard to that, he also says the pictures are a set up where he appears in an Armed Forces uniform prior to 1959. Where is the picture from?

[Betancourt] With regard to this, I can say two things: First, in the modern world of intelligence and counterintelligence it is no longer possible to doctor a picture without it being discovered. That is the first thing. Second, when this picture was unglued from the file, on the back it had the name of the photographer and the date when the picture was taken. In other words, it says Agustin Photo, 407 Monte Street, 11 October 1957. Every commercial photographer has the habit of marking his photos. This is the mark of the original photo that he had to present for his identification in the police.

[Narrator] On 8 January 1959, the day when Commander in Chief Fidel Castro made his triumphant entrance into Havana, the then chief of the National Revolutionary Police, Efigenio Ameijeiras, sent a message to all the forces under his command. In compliance with the instructions of the Commander in Chief of the Rebel Forces, Fidel Castro Ruz, the police chief announced that all members of the National Police who had acted in a dignified and honorable manner in the performance of their duties would remain in their present positions—they would continue in the police service they were assigned to together with the members of the glorious rebel army, in accordance with the army's reorganization.

[Martinez] Forty days after the announcement by Commander Efigenio Ameijeira, then chief of the National Revolutionary Police, Mr Armando Valladares was discharged from the police for the best interest of the service. He was not arrested at that time. He had the same opportunity that thousands of the Armed Forces of the Batista dictatorship to rejoin Cuban society.

[Juan Mederos Miranda, bank employee; video caption reads: "Workers and neighbors who knew Valladares"] We really weren't friends. We didn't have much to do with each other despite the fact that he lived across the street from us and was employed at our work center. He always appeared to be a very arrogant person. He did not cooperate with anyone, either with us or the revolution.

[Maria Trazancos Alvarez, bank employee] Yes, we and several comrades who worked there in communications were surprised when one morning in December we saw in the newspaper a photograph of this man involved in an act of sabotage, in which dynamite use, against "La Epoca" store. He was a policeman from the Batista era, a tyrannical, oppressive, and bloodthirsty regime. In fact, he joined the police force in the last months when the regime's repression was even greater. It turns out that now he wanted to liberate a people who had already been liberated.

[Ana Maria Oria Gonzalez, neighbor] He was truly a very arrogant, authoritarian person. He thought he was very good looking.

[Mercedes Sanchez Villoch, bank employee] Something that really caught my attention about him was that one day he brought me a photo album. I saw that all the pictures in the album were of him.

[Martinez] Personal photos?

[Sanchez Villoch] His personal photos. He was posing as if he were a movie star. At the time, I think I was 19 or 20 years old when that happened, I didn't like that young man who took so many pictures of himself. I had never seen a man who kept a photo album posing that way. That seemed to me somewhat narcissistic. I didn't like it. But I continued to speak to him until a day when I went to the movies. I saw him in a documentary showing he had been captured as a terrorist in the act of putting explosives in stores and other places, movie houses, etc.

[Martinez] It surprised you? In other words, you didn't...

[Sanchez Villoch, interrupting] Yes, I told my husband who was also working with me then. Look, he wanted to be a movie star, and there he is on film. The only thing is that he came out in a different role.

[Dagoberta Morales Sanchez, neighbor] I lived back there, in the back alley, and he lived here. When I would come out here. I would see him come in and out dressed in his police uniform. The patrol car would often be waiting. Other times it would drop him off here, dressed as a policeman, very arrogant, very...

[Unidentified interviewer] Did you speak with him?

[Morales Sanchez] No, no, never. He did not speak with any one here; he spoke with no one. He was, or is, I don't know, very vain—I don't know why.

[Interviewer] Was he like that only with you or with all the neighbors on the block?

[Sanchez] No, he was like that with all the neighbors. He didn't have relationships with anyone here.

[Narrator] Cuba's state security organizations liquidated a network of terrorists in December 1960. The group was headed by Oliver Obregon, former sergeant in the repressive corps of the Batista dictatorship. Obregon's band filled Eden cigarette packs with gelatine explosives. They are the kind known as "petaquitas." Among the terrorists who were caught when they were preparing the explosive charges to later place them in public places was former policeman 2747—Armando Valladares. It was not his ideas but his criminal actions that put him in prison. He was tried according to the law which has been the norm in Cuba since 1959. He was defended on the basis of the most absolute respect for the law. His political ideas were not questioned but rather his practice of terrorism, destruction, and coverups, crimes dealt with and punished by Article 469, Section B, of the the social defense code modified by Law 923 of 4 January 1961.

[Mario Alberto Tagle, court member] This trial was held at La Cabana military fort. The revolutionary tribunal of Havana District, composed of five judges, was located at the fort. Three judges were professionals and two were lay judges. The tribunal was presided over by Captain Alfredo Ayala Garcia, now deceased; Pedro Rodriguez Fonseca, now a FAR colonel; and myself, as well as two fellow militia members representing the glorious FAR.

[Martinez] They acted as lay judges?

[Tagle] They acted as lay judges.

[Martinez] And who were the defense attorneys? How many lawyers took part in the defense?

[Tagle] Five people were accused in this case. There were three lawyers; two were selected by the accused themselves. One participated as an appointed defense attorney representing those who had not chosen an attorney so that no one would be without a defense lawyer. They were represented before the tribunal.

[Martinez] How long had you been a lawyer at that time? When did you graduate as a lawyer?

[Tagle] I graduated in 1955, so by that time I had been practicing law for 6 years.

[Martinez] Now what codes, what laws were applied or consulted to implement this sanction?

[Tagle] In procedural matters, the revolutionary court was guided by the prosecution law which then existed in Cuba and by the procedural law of "Cuba in Arms" used by the Liberation Army forces during the war of independence. As regards substantive legislation, the social defense code then in effect was used.

[Martinez] Did you have sufficient evidence to find the accused guilty?

[Tagle] Yes, yes. Independent from the accused's statements, evidence from witnesses was extensive. In addition, there was also the seizure of weapons, terrorist tools, etc. That was absolutely established. The evidence was sufficient to arrive at a sentence.

[Martinez] Dr Fernandez, you were one of the three lawyers who took part in Case No 5 of 1961 in which Mr Armando Valladares was found guilty. From the legal standpoint, what was the trial held at La Cabana like?

[Dr Humberto Fernandez Martinez, lawyer] The trial took place in courtroom No 1, one of the revolutionary tribunals in La Cabana. The trial was held in accordance with legal provisions at the time. These trials were summary trials. That did not mean in any way that the accused or prosecuted in those cases did not enjoy the necessary guarantees to be able to exercise their rights, to be able to submit the evidence they deemed necessary, and in fact to designate a lawyer in their trust or their families' trust.

[Martinez] How long had you been a lawyer in 1961?

[Fernandez] I had been practicing law for 14 years.

[Martinez] Are you still working as a lawyer?

[Fernandez] Yes, I am still working as a lawyer at the National Arbitration Organ. I am the secretary.

[Martinez] We recently met Jose Arbolay Pino in Remedios, Villa Clara Province. He was born in Camaiguan in 1933. He's been living for over 25 years in Remedios. Arbolay was in jail and knew Armando Valladares. That is why we have invited him to this program, "Wide Angle," and we have him here in Studio 15 of Tele-Rebelde.

Did you also belong to the Armed Forces of the Batista tyranny?

[Arbolay, former inmate] Yes, from 1 August 1954 up to 31 December 1958.

[Martinez] Did you belong to the police or the Army?

[Arbolay] I was in the Army.

[Martinez] Right, now you are working in Remedios as a planning accountant. Where do you work?

[Arbolay] At the miscellaneous crops enterprise in Remedios municipality.

[Martinez] Now tell me, what were living conditions like in Isle of Pines, where you met Armando Valladares? When did you arrive on Isle of Pines, why were you there, and when did you meet Valladares?

[Arbolay] I was sentenced for a crime against the state. I was sentenced to 3 years in jail at the National Penitentiary. We arrived there in June or July of 1960. We were assigned to section No 3 until some construction in No 4 was finished. The old Public Works Ministry was repairing the showers and doing some other work. We then moved to Section 4. The cells were open. None were closed. We had hallways, staircases—communication was normal. At that time there were very few prisoners there. Later, Valladares arrived with Pedro Luis Wittel, Captain Perdomo, and other prisoners.

We visited a cooperative. The cooperatives were a way to improve the food in jail. As luck would have it, that's where I met Valladares. These people were wealthy. They were not in jail for money problems. They were in jail for conspiracy, for acts of terrorism against the 1 January revolution that had just been born.

[Martinez] You mean there were class distinctions inside the jail?

[Arbolay] There were class distinctions. They drew the curtains when they were making coffee, for instance. You could smell the coffee but they were the ones to enjoy it.

[Martinez] But you were from a lower-income class. Why were you in the moneyed group?

[Arbolay] I also had (?a portable stove). I sold it for three packs of cigarettes. They also had a bank account; their relatives sent them the money. At least that's what was rumored. With hindsight, one can better realize that it came from other places. That's what it would take to keep up that standard in Gerona with constant deliveries of boxes of food—they were huge. It was one box after another. The poorer inmates, those who had just made a simple mistake, could not have that.

[Martinez] Arbolay, did you ever know Valladares to have a literary bent during that period? You do yourself, don't you? You had literary ambitions and you still have them. I have seen certificates, prizes that you have won in several national contests. Did Valladares have literary ambitions?

[Arbolay] Valladares was never a writer. There is something that's innate in a writer. When a writer writes something, he shows it to others right away. He tries to share it, whether happy or sad. Valladares showed no signs of literary concerns. He had none. On the contrary, Valladares was always walking around with Wittel and Perdomo, visiting the cooperative. The main person in the cooperative was Armando Merio, a man who used to own a vineyard.

[Martinez] Was Valladares the leader or was he just a friend of the leaders?

[Arbolay] No, he was not a leader. He was like the right-hand man. He was a shadow behind the leaders. He was trying to win some prestige—quote, unquote—among them. His claim to fame was that he had planted bombs. And he spoke about it. He told how they took Ping-Pong balls and put chlorates and other chemical substances in them. They brought these Ping-Pong balls into the big stores and placed them among the fabrics, etc. They exploded spontaneously. I don't know too much about it, but they exploded spontaneously and produced a fire.

He went around with Vladimir, better known as the little doctor, a psychologist who was caught at the Naroca Building for his counterrevolutionary activities. He was known for the [words indistinct] bombs he had. Valladares and Vladimir spoke about all that, and they boasted about how they used a mixture of gelatine explosives in cigarette packs...

[Martinez, interrupting] And you had feelings of indignation, even in jail?

[Arbolay] I was so indignant that...[changes thought] I learned about the rottenness that existed inside the jail. Though I must say that not all inmates were like that. There have been inmates who have changed their lives. They have children who belong to the Union of Young Communists. They are officials. Some of those inmates work today; they do their duty and are respected in their work centers. No one tells them: Go away, we don't want you. On the contrary, they were welcomed back into society.

[Martinez] Did Valladares have patriotic concerns? Did he speak about Jose Marti?

[Arbolay] No, he was never mentioned. Neither were Maceo, Maximo Gomez, or others. Those matters were not mentioned. Basically, all they ever talked about was Fidel's fall from power, how they were going to kill all communists. They talked about lists they had already made up of the communists they were going to kill in each town. That's how they put it. They talked about how communism had to be excised by the roots; they said that even newborn babies had to be grabbed by their little feet and their heads dashed against the wall.

[Martinez] You mean they used that kind of language?

[Arbolay] That's how they talked, with crude language. In fact, I remember that an inmate's mother brought him some "ojitos de Santa Lucia" [charms in the shape of eyes used to ward off the evil eye]. You know how mothers are, they love their children no matter what they've done. She brought him some "ojitos de Santa Lucia," and his reaction was: Why did you bring me "ojitos de Santa Lucia"? What I want you to bring me are "ojos de milicianos" [play on words: literally, "militiamen's eyes"]. Well, that was really scary. You had to be there and see it, see what kind of people we had to share the jail with. It was something truly sad.

[Martinez] That was just before the Bay of Pigs. Perhaps they had some information about the U.S. plans to attack Cuba and they were deluding themselves.

[Arbolay] There was a young man surnamed Vila in that cooperative. He worked in a bank. Apparently, the bank had a branch; or maybe it was the other way around, this bank was a branch of a Miami bank. Someone named Bennett was an officer or the manager of the bank. They received a lot of information through this Bennett. I don't know if that was the right name, whether it was Bennett or something that sounded like that. But the fact is that they received a lot of information. Then, during visiting hours, and even in telegrams, through certain clues or codes, they received information. They were expecting something to happen before the Bay of Pigs. After the Bay of Pigs, their hopes of recovering all that they had lost—in some cases their positions as generals, colonels—were dashed.

Valladares, too, was depressed, because he visited one of Masferrer's "tigers"; he also visited Mecho Cabrera, known as "Old Tiger." He visited a former captain of the SIM [special police] surnamed Granela who had studied at Fort Bragg or the Canal Zone and taught courses in antiterrorism and interrogation techniques. He visited them; he visited former policemen in the motor division. There was this guy who had a tattoo on his arm that read: "Don't Look at Me." He bragged once in a conversation that he had killed six people.

[Martinez] In other words, the Cuban penitentiary system was a different school for you; different from Valladares', of course.

[Arbolay] Absolutely.

[Martinez] Now tell me, did you ever hear him talk about his protectors, about Piedra, Carratala, or other notorious henchmen?

[Arbolay] At first he tried to cover up his background as a Batista policeman. He pretended to be an opponent of the revolutionary government. This gradually subsided, shall we say. There were men in jail who had been policemen like him. So, he had to come clean about it, because it was something that was looked at in a bad light at the time. There was a split, a big one, between policemen and counterrevolutionaries. There were policemen and military officers sentenced for crimes in the early days of the revolution. These counterrevolutionaries were jailed later.

There were presidential ambitions too. There were four or five in anticipation of the time when Fidel fell. It was an obsession.

[Martinez] They saw themselves as presidential candidates.

[Arbolay] That's right. They saw themselves as president already. For instance, there was Dr Oliva of the MRRE [expansion unknown] and Nino Diaz. Carlos Martinez Chapman was going to be the strongman, a general, the chief of the army. They were planning to see who was going to be governor, mayor, minister, etc. Let five of them get together and you have a political party.

[Martinez] Did you know about Valladares' attempts to escape from jail?

[Arbolay] Yes, I knew about his escape. I play a lot of chess. I learned how to play and I play quite well. It was a distraction. Valladares once asked me for a belt, a military belt. Apparently he wanted to dye it green. At night, when sounds travel more easily, he and Wittel listened for passwords and other signs outside that might serve their purposes. One night, they let themselves down from a cell window—I don't remember exactly which one. One of them hurt his leg, I believe. They failed in their attempt.

[Narrator] After his capture 48 hours later, he was not brought to trial nor was his sentence extended, as provided for for this type of act. It was quite the opposite from violating his human rights. Valladares availed himself of the humanitarian atmosphere prevailing in the penitentiaries. He even pretended that he had contracted a paralysis that later produced the title for the libelous "From My Wheelchair."

[Martinez] Orlando Contreras Castro was born in Chile 50 years ago. He has been a journalist for more than 30 years. He is presently a correspondent for ALASEI [Latin American Agency for Special Information Services], of the SELA, Latin American Economic System, and also correspondent in Havana for the Uruguayan weekly, BRECHA.

[Contreras, journalist] One afternoon in late October 1982, we were summoned—and I say we, because all newsmen accredited in Havana were summoned to the Jose Marti International Airport to see the paralyzed Armando Valladares leave the country. I remember it was a wet October afternoon. I don't remember if it was 20 or 22 October. We were there, a group of newsmen; there were the AFP, ANSA, EFE, IPS correspondents. In short, a rather large group of foreign correspondents. We were really curious to see this figure, because we knew from reports by international press agencies that this was a man who claimed to be paralyzed as a result of the torture he had suffered, according to those reports, in Castro's jails—I am quoting here.

Well, we saw this gentleman dressed in a dark blue suit. He was walking very easily, almost with an athlete's walk. He was accompanied by functionaries from the French Embassy in Cuba. He boarded the plane on a wet October afternoon accompanied by the political counsellor of the French Embassy in Cuba, Mr Pierre Charras. He accompanied Valladares on this flight. I learned later that he changed planes in Madrid. He traveled executive class. In Paris, he was received by one of President Francois Mitterrand's advisers: Mr Regis Debray.

[Martinez] Writer Regis Debray, who is an adviser of French President Mitterrand, did indeed play a role in obtaining the release of Armando Valladares. e now remembers him in a book that has just been published by Gallimard Editions in France. It's a 300-page book entitled "The Masks." Regis Debray says the following about Armando Valladares in this book: The man was not a poet. The poet was not paralytic. The Cuban is no longer Cuban. He is now an American. As if this were not enough, Debray adds, Valladares now sides with the extreme conservatives in the United States and with the Nicaraguan counterrevolution.

[Narrator] Valladares' paralysis was one big lie manufactured by the propaganda machinery of the United States and some of its allies, which portrayed him to the world as a victim. The faker Valladares received the best care from a medical team headed by Dr Rodrigo Alvarez Cambras, professor of orthopedics and traumatology, director of the Frank Pais Hospital, and chief of the national medical rehabilitation group. It was first thought that the former policeman was seeking special status as a prisoner. However, it was soon discovered that the myth of invalidism was aimed at slandering the Cuban penitentiary system and discrediting the humanitarian nature of the revolution. The prisoner led a double life then. In front of the doctors, guards, and jailmates, he was an invalid who resisted treatment and would not cooperate with the specialists in an act of defiance. In the dark, inside his cell or in medical confinement, he went through a series of exercises worthy of an athlete.

When he found himself unmasked, Valladares asked that he not be sent back to prison. He feared reprisals from his deceived fellow prisoners. Waiting for the false invalid poet, a wheelchair remained unused in Paris.

[Unidentified interviewer, off-screen, in French; video shows Armando Valladares seated] The prisoner we see in his prison cell exercising is Armando Valladares.

[Valladares] It looks like me exercising. However, those exercises can always be seen by the military. They are not done behind their backs. The officers have access, can see the prisoner because there are no doors.

[Interviewer] But you believe that's you in prison?

[Valladares] Yes, I believe that the one doing the exercises could be me. [video caption: "Valladares: Poet?"]

[Pablo Armando Fernandez, Cuban poet] I believe that anyone who has experienced poetry, no matter how limited the experience may be, is able to realize that he is not a poet. What really offends me as a poet is that the poet works with an instrument that is common to all human beings. He works with words. The real value of poetry is the authenticity of those words, the truth that may be implicit in what is being said. The Valladares book was called "From My Wheelchair," yet Valladares was not an invalid. He is a liar. If Valladares has lied with his poetry, anything he does, anything he says will always be a lie to me.

This is a terrible impression, because I feel it is a kind of offense to poetry. I have something more to say: Outside of Cuba, I was told that when Valladares left Havana, it was very obvious that he was not a poet, that he was not an intellectual, that he was a man without any culture. However, it was also obvious that he was a man who was skilled enough that you could use him to play politics. That is what has happened. Bad, dirty, brutal politics is being played with this individual.

[Hector Mujica, Venezuelan writer] The Valladares affair, which is the euphemistic, or rather, journalistic name given to it by the press in the Latin American subcontinent, is one of the biggest frauds in history. It is

one of the biggest "escroqueries," [swindles] as the French say. In terms of poetry, it is really a big "truffa"—you have to say it in several languages, which also means a swindle. As I wrote in a recent article about the so-called Cuban dissident intellectuals—very few of them were intellectuals but a lot of them were former policemen—there is authentic poetry and there is false poetry. It is the latter kind that Valladares practices. How big can the swindle be? A man who pretended to be paralyzed and wasn't. A man who says he writes poetry and turns out to be a CIA agent to the extent that a terrorist like him has been appointed a representative of the Reagan government—not of the American people—to the UN Human Rights Commission. This is truly incredible. He is closer to Orlando Bosch than he is to poetry. He is closer to the CIA than to poetry. In fact, Bosch—this terrorist, this practitioner of genocide, the mastermind of the explosion that killed scores of innocent young people—was going to be given an appointment. Valladares and Bosch are tethered together. Both believe in the American way of life [preceding phrase in English] and, of course, they are direct disciples of the Reagan administration, which suckles them.

[Miguel Barnet, Cuban writer] Well, I have seen Armando Valladares several times at public forums abroad. His performance has always been pitiful, especially one time when he spoke with journalists in Italy. They asked him about literature and he was unable to say a single word. This shows, of course, that he is not a literate man. I am not one to judge the poetry and the writings of Armando Valladares, because poetry is something highly subjective, but in my opinion—and this is a subjective opinion—Armando Valladares is anything but a poet. His life, even if he had never written a single poem, demonstrates that he is not a poet because...[5-second break in transmission] Armando Valladares is a member of my generation. I remember perfectly well how, when Armando Valladares was filling out his application to join the repressive forces of the Batista dictatorship and was even promoted, I saw many other members of my generation—members of the 26 July Movement, for instance—die in the streets of Havana, die in El Laguito, die on the roads. I saw how the frontmen, the janissaries of the dictatorship brought the bodies of the Giral sisters in sacks dripping with blood down some stairs at 24th and 19th Streets. I was there, I saw it.

To think that this man, no less, speaks in the name of the United States as a representative or whatever, of human rights in Geneva; it seems to me a macabre joke. I consider it something sinister. It makes me very sad, and I truly feel uncomfortable speaking of such a disgusting character.

[Martinez] In his book "Against All Hope," Mr Valladares asserts that he was a University of Havana student but the name of the former police agent of the Batista dictatorship does not appear in that higher education center's records. At that time, he could have been a university student as any other Cuban, but he really was involved in other activities which were not educational.

[Rafael Hernandez, American Studies Center] There are numerous cases, especially in this administration, that help to explain the presence of Valladares in the human rights commission. Jose Zorzano, for example, was alternate U.S. ambassador during the period in which Jeane Kirkpatrick was ambassador to the United Nations. Zorzano is now president of the counterrevolutionary National Cuban-American Foundation which we have seen very active of late against Cuba's presence in the Pan-American Games. In fact, it is an organization with large financial resources backed by the U.S. security organs and personally endorsed by President Reagan. In addition to Zorzano there are figures such as Otto Reich, who was chief for Central America at the State Department and is currently U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. There are also several members of the Cuban-American bourgeoisie in Miami who have been and are cochairmen of Reagan's so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative. These appointments are not casual ones. They are placed in areas where they aim to legitimize U.S. policies toward Latin America, especially toward Central America.

However, it is not only in connection with its relations with Latin America. This also attempts to create the image that it is getting closer to the Hispanics or Latins in the United States. People such as, for example, Tirso del Junco, chairman of the Republican committee in California—which as we know is Reagan's state—and also chairman of the Hispanics Committee within the Republican Party, and Miami Mayor Xavier Suarez are political figures who have been promoted to important positions within U.S. domestic policy. They convey an image of good Latins, of Latins within the system; in other words, Reagan's Latins. If you allow me to make this comparison, it is as if Jonas Savimbi were to be appointed honorary chairman of a committee of black conservatives who supported the most conservative wing of the Republican Party.

[Martinez] We have Dr Mauro Casagrandi in Tele-Rebelde's Studio 15 for "Wide Angle." He was born in Italy. He has diplomatic experience. He saw the interview with Armando Valladares in Italy. I begin by asking his opinion of that interview.

[Casagrandi] As to the interview on Italian television, I believe that it was quite clear that he is no intellectual. When he was asked questions, it seemed to me that he was reciting a lesson by rote, as if he had been coached. He did not know very well what poet to refer to, what writer to refer to. He does not know what school or who influenced him most in his alleged intellectual formation. It is clearly shown that this was a man trained to do this kind of work, which consists of strong propaganda against Cuba.

[Martinez] Dr Casagrandi, you knew the inner workings of the Central Intelligence Agency. It seems that it is precisely the CIA which is basically supporting Mr Armando Valladares, portraying him as a prisoner of conscience in Cuba, as a dissident. I would like your comments about the CIA's methods in the search and manufacture of this kind of dissident.

[Casagrandi] Well, I have had the opportunity to participate directly within the CIA in the preparation of ideological propaganda against Cuba in particular. Cuba publicly denounced this CIA war against Cuba recently. The creation of dissidents is part of this war. So, all those who have been able to see the material on Cuban television have been able to see clearly how the CIA fabricates the so-called dissidents. Those are creatures of the CIA, which selects them, trains them, has them undergo a whole training program, and then launches them around the world to make the world believe that in a given country—in this case, Cuba—there are problems among the intellectuals.

It makes it look as if there were no freedom for intellectuals and that is why there are dissidents. Of course, these dissidents are made to look important because the intellectuals are an important group in any country, a group with influence, a group that shapes public opinion.

So, what the CIA wants is to make it look like those dissidents exist basically in the socialist countries; in this case, Cuba, which is a well-known case. I would say that it is a good thing that the only one they have been able to find is a criminal. [laughs] There is no dissent in Cuba among intellectuals. On the contrary, Cuban intellectuals are (?complete) revolutionaries.

So, no matter how hard they have tried to find one, the only one they could find was a member of the Batista police, a terrorist, a prisoner for more than 22 years, someone who has acted completely at odds with everything the Americans themselves call human rights.

[Martinez] Mr Armando Valladares has also posed abroad as a devout Catholic. Despite this, he has offended the Cuban ecclesiatic hierarchy. The Cuban Episcopal Conference, on 15 May 1986, wrote to a French publication protesting slanderous statements by Mr Valladares.

I will read two paragraphs of the letter from the Cuban Episcopal Conference:

We bishops of Cuba do not intend to respond to these offensive, gratuitous, and false statements as they do not deserve a response. We would only like to go on record, Mr Director, to say how sad and puzzled we are to see them published in the newspaper LA CROIX.

Cuban patriot Jose Marti has some verses that read as if they were dedicated to him. [video caption: "Poetry is sacred; Let no one take it from another; Let no one summon it willingly, like an unhappy slave who dries his tears to rush to his unmerciful master; Or she shall come, pale and loveless, as a slave"]

For Cuban television viewers, who know Mr Armando Valladares perfectly well, the conclusions of this program are obvious. However, outside Cuba, the multimillion-dollar propaganda the United States has carried out around this figure might have confused even honest people.

But, today or tomorrow, many will ask how is it possible for an inmate who was so savagely tortured in Cuban jails to have such good health.

As to his appointment, I believe that it will go down in history as one of the last wishes of President Ronald Reagan in the final stretch of his second and last term in the White House.

Haiti

CED Calls for Strike 6 Feb, Mourning 7 Feb

FL042155 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The opposition gathered into the Committee for Democratic Agreement [CED] calls on all union, professional, industrial, commercial, peasant, religious, and civic organizations and the entire Haitian people to observe a general strike nationwide on Saturday, 6 February 1988. It also calls for a day of national mourning and censure on Sunday, 7 February 1988, the day of the inauguration of new Haitian President Leslie Manigat. Here is the CED press release:

Since the shameful proclamation of the so-called results of the sham elections of last 17 January, the Haitian people have repeatedly expressed their unequivocal opposition to the unconstitutional, illegitimate, and macoute government the National Government Council intends to force upon them through the force of its bayonets.

This opposition has been expressed through all kinds of demonstrations and position statements, the most recent of which were the ecumenical ceremony organized at Petit-Seminaire [College Saint-Martial] on 23 January and the procession at Saint Gerard parish on 2 February.

The CED communique continues: Two years after the historic date of 7 February 1986, we have come to realize that our desire for change, justice, and progress—a desire that led us to effect 7 February 1986 before the eyes of the entire world—has been frustrated .

Together with the whole democratic population of Haiti, the CED opposed, and continues to grimly oppose, the coup d'etat against the Constitution that is the product of the sham elections of 17 January—elections which themselves are contested by most of international public opinion.

The communique adds: With this same energy, the CED intends to fight for the establishment in Haiti of a rule of law, based on respect for the Constitution and human rights, that will have come to power through free and honest elections in keeping with the Constitution.

To manifest this common will and, as usual, fully aware of our responsibilities, we the leaders of the CED call on union, professional, industrial, commercial, peasant, religious, and civic organizations, and the whole Haitian people to observe a general strike nationwide on Saturday, 6 February 1988.

The communique continues: We call on these same organizations and on the Haitian people to observe on 7 February 1988 a day of national mourning and censure, to oppose the parody of an inauguration that has been scheduled for that day.

People of Haiti, remain firm in your refusal and your determination, the way we are remaining firm in ours. The battle for democracy and for respect of the Constitution, guarantee of change and progress, has only just begun.

[Signed] For the CED: Marc Louis Bazin, for MIDH [Movement for the Implementation of Democracy in Haiti]; Reverend Sylvio Claude, for PDCH [Haitian Christian Democratic Party]; Louis Dejoie II, for PAIN [National Agricultural and Industrial Party]; and Gerard Gourgue, for the National Concerted Action Front.

Msgr Romelus Sermon Denounces Repression

FL042341 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Excerpts] We will now go to the Grande Anse area, particularly Corail, where repression is ravaging the population like a hurricane. We will listen to Monsignor Romelus, who is denouncing this situation, and who also has other things to say.

[Begin Romelus recording] I correct those I love; and I bless them.

Therefore, be zealous and repent! Apocalypse, Chapter three, verse 19. Brethren, it is with these few words that I today wish to come and chat with you. In view of all the calamities befalling you, you might think that God has dropped you, forgotten about you. Can a mother forget her child? Even if a mother were to forget her child, I, the Lord, will never forget you. So says the psalm; and it's true. [passage omitted]

No, God has not, and will not, abandon you. But what does God want? He wants you to change. He wants you to leave all that is evil and do what is right. That is why he is calling us and saying: Come back to me.

Today it is to all of you that he is saying: Come back to me. That is to say: Change your behavior, change the way you act. What's in it for you, when you commit evil? Stop doing evil. Love all your brethren. You should not be seeking advantages for yourselves. Rather, you should be seeking the good of all.

You people of Corail, just like everyone in the diocese whom they are putting through the mill, it is to you I am speaking. I am also appealing to all those who feel they might join these people, because the same things are going on in diverse places.

On Sunday, 31 January 1988, I went to Corail to see what was going on. I found a demobilized population, ready to go back to being zombies, as before 7 February 1986. Why? Because a military subdistrict authority was acting like a macoute, like a dictator, vis-a-vis the population. He and two or three others were sowing terror. The population cannot protest, cannot talk, cannot assemble.

In that parish there was a Canadian team that had among it doctors and teachers. They were working with the people, helping the people. They had to flee.

In that same parish nuns and pastors had primary schools, a home economics center, a dispensary, and so forth. They too had to abandon their efforts. Some of them became seriously ill due to the acts of barbarism they saw being committed against the people working with them and against others. They too had to leave town.

Considering how isolated Corail is, we wonder where the poor are going to go when they are sick. [passage omitted]

I met with a few people on that trip. They said: What can we hope for? We cannot pray for him to be transferred, because if they send him somewhere else, he will do to them what he is doing to us. And the suffering would still be ours.

I was astonished to hear this; and pleased. They don't want to get rid of their burden by placing it on the shoulders of their brethren. All of you listening to me should reflect upon this. [passage omitted]

Why is this man acting like this? He, like others who behave this way, is being excessive to show they are devoted to an indefensible cause. Yes, indefensible! Who can justify the criminal acts of 29 November?

Just as General Kebreau massacred the people in Bel-Air in order to prepare 22 September 1957 [the elections through which Francois Duvalier came to power], we were given the 29 November blow to force us to drink down 17 January 1988. But the people says that it will not swallow the mouthful.

Who today has such a short memory that he can accept this? We have heard that a few people are saying the people appointed on 17 January 1988 should be given a chance to show what they will be like. Beware. It is by giving such chances that we are always caught in a trap.

Remember that when Francois Duvalier fell, Jean-Claude loosened the reins. He pleased people by arresting a few macoutes. They let people talk freely. Then he put down roots, and when he was firmly on his feet, he began to tighten all the screws.

When the CNG [National Government Council] came to power on 7 February 1986, it loosened the reins. When certain people were saying "Don't trust it!", others were saying "Give it a chance." Once it felt strong enough, it began to repress [kraze, brize] and we fell into our present predicament—a dictatorship tougher than the preceding one.

You people who are saying "Give it a chance", what are you going to do about the Constitution? Trample it, as the leaders are doing? As I said in June, 1987, are you going to let them violate the Constitution like that? It's just not possible! Foreign countries that respect their own Constitutions and that recognize the vile, dishonest, actions of 17 January 1987, are showing that they are nothing but trash.

Can darkness be called light? Can death be labeled life? Can lies be labeled truth? Can mud be described as cleaniness? Are they able to call Satan God?

Both the Haitians and the foreign governments that think we should drink down the vile dirty water we were given on 17 January are defending their own interests. They are people who are against Haiti. What person who really loves Haiti could ask us to accept 17 January? We are saying we are not going to drink this down.

I again point out that I am not against any particular individual. I am defending the principles in the Constitution. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Priest Urges Protest

FL041508 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] The Reverend Father (Massac) has issued a new message in connection with the difficult situation in which the Haitian people find themselves today. This new message from Father (Massac) is entitled: Watch Out For Those Bones, For You Are Not Dogs!

Any Christian, any patriot, who because of his own integrity and for the general welfare protested an unjust situation, should not allow others to silence him by offering him personal advantages. If he allows this, his followers should drop him.

People who believe in God, people who truly seek the good of the country, cannot allow brute force and unscrupulous, underhanded dealings to become the only law prevailing in Haiti. They must struggle staunchly so that Haiti's leaders may be guided only by the nation's Constitution. They must struggle unceasingly not to accept a de facto situation in which a particular citizens group forcefully seizes power, in violation of all the nation's laws, so it may do as it pleases with the Haitian people.

Almost all the nation's sectors understand this duty. That is why they have risen up and are protesting and organizing to prevent this situation from continuing.

What are the heavy-handed leaders, who have no respect for the nation's Constitution, going to do to silence all these sectors which are protesting—protests that are causing their unpopularity to be too evident? Using national reconciliation and the need to rebuild the country to bring about an economic revival as pretexts, they are offering important sectors and influential leaders in Haiti certain advantages under the illegal government to bring them into line.

Can a patriot, a serious Christian, allow them to buy off consciences like this? Actually, those who agree to abandon the people's camp—people who are justly demanding their rights—to side with those who are holding power by means of force, without the benefit of honest elections as stipulated in the nation's Constitution, are betraying a just cause. This constitutes selling out the country.

The habit of placing personal interests before the good of the nation that many Haitian citizens have, can cause them to fail to hear God's voice through their conscience. However, the Gospel of Jesus Christ condemns this. The Haitian people, who are struggling for their rights, which are being violated right and left, might feel in their hearts a profound contempt for such citizens, who side with the exploiters to get a share of the cake that is being apportioned.

Beware, Christians. Beware, honest Haitians who love your country. You are not dogs, who cannot resist lunging for a bone that is tendered to you, forgetting all about the ideal of the good of the Haitian people, which you should continue to defend.

A citizen protesting abuses and the violations of the nation's Constitution in the 17 January elections, cannot now come and say, now that the leaders have done what they set out to do, that they should be given a chance so we can see if their statements are sincere, so we can

verify their good will in establishing democracy in the country and setting up an honest administration under which Haiti can progress and under which all citizens will have their share of the country's resources.

If, in the face of an illegitimate government, you ask citizens to stop their protests, to calm down for a while to give such a government time to implement the program it has announced, what you really want is for that government, which has no basis, to remain in power for good against the will of the great majority of the citizens and to the benefit of the group of (?pleasure-seekers), whom you too are attempting to join, so you can benefit along with them.

Thus we can see what was in the heart of certain leaders when they said they sought the good of the country.

There are those who are asking for a period of calm in a violent situation that the leaders created on purpose to see what a government that the Haitian people do not want can come up with. These people know full well that, aside from the question of whether or not it will keep its promises, once that government has put down roots, it will be much more difficult to get rid of it than if you had prevented it from getting a foothold from the very beginning, when it first made its move to seize power.

No compromise is possible with an illegitimate government based on contempt for the nation's Constitution, on the violation of the rights of citizens, and on the chicanery and irregularities that everyone is denouncing.

The Haitian people are asking only one thing: to finally have an honest government that they themselves choose by elections in keeping with the Constitution that the Haitian people ratified.

I myself, Father (Massac), believe that that is also what God wants for the Haitian people. That is why you are hearing my voice often these days.

Everyone who wants to establish the Gospel of Jesus Christ in our country and all patriotic citizens who want the Haitian people to progress should see the struggle through to the end toward that goal.

God will support you, because it is you who are within your rights.

Manigat on Duvalierism, Reform, Military Role

FL041434 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Leslie Manigat, the new Haitian president-elect, met the press this morning at his temporary office on the Champ de Mars. You were there, weren't you, (Clarens)?

[(Clarens)] Yes, I attended the news conference, during which President-elect Manigat discussed the press. He promised his government would, to the extent the executive is capable of so doing, contribute to a free, honest, and competent press in Haiti. He emphasized that the different sides of each story should be told.

I am not asking you to like me. That will come through the achievements of my government. I am asking, rather, that the rules of the democratic game be respected, Manigat said.

There were many questions asked. One of them concerned the first things the Manigat government intended to do. Manigat answered that one of his first initiatives would be to once again offer a hand to the opposition and to everyone.

He again said: I am the president of all Haitians. I will not be the president of a single political party, but of all Haitians. The country needs peace, unity, and work. I am calling for reconciliation and national unity.

Mr Manigat also advocates dialogue and consensus. Drawing his inspiration from Venezuelan democracy, he said that, for example, the Army had to be brought into the democracy. The split between the military and civilian society must be set aside to achieve the democracy we want in Haiti, he said. He also insisted on the rules of the democratic game, saying that republican order and discipline must be respected, that people must learn to respect the rules of the democratic game.

Manigat stated that the opposition's role is not to overthrow governments but rather to criticize the government, with a view to winning the next elections and prodding the government in power to accomplish things.

Speaking of his government's plans, Mr Manigat said he was going to work toward the well-being of the urban and peasant masses. [passage omitted]

As to reforms in Haiti, Mr Manigat stressed that a political line could not just disappear overnight in a country, especially not in Haiti, where a particular political line dominated the political scene for 30 years. He used as an example Italian fascism. With democracy, Manigat said,dictatorial practices will cease, and have already begun to cease. Mr Manigat thinks it is normal that there be a Duvalierist line in Haiti. Besides, Manigat said, I consider Duvalierism a residual political phenomenon. We must recover for democracy the residue, those disappointed with Duvalierism, Manigat stated, because there are many people in Haiti whom Duvalierism has disappointed.

Still in connection with reforms, Mr Manigat said there would be no witchhunts in Haiti. He thinks it doesn't make sense. He demands honesty, competence, and effectiveness in public administration. I would prefer to train, rather than to fire, he said, speaking of government employees.

Regarding his government's 5-year term, he insisted on explaining, in connection with the year 2004, that he had not meant that he was planning to stay in power until the year 2004. In answer to a question to this effect, he said: I will act so as not to leave power before the end of my mandate, but I will not remain in power a single day longer than that mandate. [passage omitted]

During an interview that Manigat granted a French Catholic weekly recently, he stated his future government would not have members of the Armed Forces in it, as such. He said he envisages including one or two individuals from outside his political party, the RDNP [Assembly of Progressive National Democrats]. Mr Manigat also stressed the apolitical character of the Haitian Army. He said he was impressed by the way Venezuela had been able to bring its Army into the democratic fabric of the nation. He recalled that one of the aspects of this policy was to have reserved the position of Minister of Defense for a member of the Armed Forces. We have not yet reached any decision on this matter, but since we draw our inspiration from the Venezuelan experience, we might possibly consider this, Manigat added. [passage omitted]

Mr Manigat also protested the way the 17 January elections in Haiti were presented worldwide. He said he felt the general process was clear, honest, and straightforward. [passage omitted] These were statements made by the new Haitian president to the French Catholic weekly LE PELERIN.

Discusses Relations With Church

FL042309 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Excerpts] The new president issuing from the 17 January 1988 elections, Mr Leslie Francois Manigat, yesterday held a news conference during which he touched on diverse topics. Some of them were his relations with the press, the matter of members of the Armed Forces in his cabinet, and his government's relations with the church. One of our reporters attended the news conference. [passage omitted]

To the question as to how he would feel if the church refused to say a Te Deum for him on 7 February, Leslie Manigat answered that he was a Catholic and a Christian, but that a Te Deum was not obligatory, that there were countries in which the president took the oath of office before the legislative chamber. He said that, furthermore, he had not noticed any mention of a Te Deum in the inauguration protocol.

Mr Manigat took the opportunity to talk about the church. First of all, he said he had nothing against the church and that he did not know if the church had anything against him. Secondly, he said he is a Catholic. He must try to have good relations with the church. Third, as a politician, he acknowledges the value of the church and hopes that the democratic system will be able to benefit from the church's collaboration. Fourth, he would like to see the church work to calm spirits, setting an example of moral responsibility in every sense.

Mr Manigat said he had good relations with certain members of the church, such as priests, other clergymen, and bishops. He asserted that he had no problems in connection with religion with anyone at all but that he might have a political problem with a particular individual.

But beware, beware, said Mr Manigat. The law will not fail to put a priest in his place just because he is wearing a cassock, Mr Manigat said.

COPPPAL Statement on 17 Jan Elections

FL042245 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] A six-member delegation from the Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties [COPPPAL] declared yesterday, Wednesday, here in Port-au-Prince, that the 17 January general elections held in Haiti were in violation of the Constitution.

At the end of a 3-day fact-finding mission in Haiti, Mr Luis Gomez, who is vice chairman of the Panamanian Legislative Assembly and head of the delegation, told the press that if the 29 November elections had been held, they would have resulted in the victory of one of the four candidates who today represent the opposition forces and that there would have been massive participation in the elections by the population.

For Mr Gomez, the paralysis of the 29 November elections and the terrorist actions by the military and paramilitary forces represent a military coup d'etat against the constitutional democratic process and against the will of the majority of the Haitian people.

For the vice chairman of the Panamanian parliament, the elections that carried Mr Leslie Manigat to power were characterized by fraud and intimidation and are not considered valid by the Haitian people.

The COPPPAL members also held a news conference yesterday. We had reporters there.

The six-member COPPAL delegation, which has been in Haiti for the past 3 days, held a news conference at Mais Gate Airport at noon, before they left.

These observers, who have the mandate of 35 COPPPAL member organizations, made a statement on their visit to Haiti. Panamanian Parliament member Luis Gomez was their spokeman. He said the delegation had met with leaders of the democratic opposition, the religious sector, the union movement, members of the diplomatic corps, and Dr Leslie Manigat. However, although they had requested a meeting with CNG [National Government Council] President Henri Namphy through diplomatic channels before coming to Haiti, Namphy did not receive them.

Although they will write a report later, they can set forth four points they noticed during their mission that the different sectors with which they met had in common. Only Dr Leslie Manigat's point of view differed.

The first of the four common points they found is that they think if the 29 November elections had been held, one or another of the four Committee for Democratic Agreement [CED] candidates would have been victorious and there would have been massive participation by the population in the 29 November elections.

Secondly, they say that terrorist actions (?by) the military forces and the macoutes prevented these elections from being held and this and the decision to dismiss the constitutional CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] constitutes a coup d'etat by the Army against the constitutional democratic process, which has revolted the people. It is the CNG, which following the 29 November elections strayed from the path pointed out by the Constitution and by the will of the people, that organized the 17 January elections. In the unconstitutional 17 January elections, the official authorities declared Dr Leslie Manigat the winner, but the democratic forces representing the people did not participate in these elections. The elections were marred by much fraud and many irregularities and only some 7 or 8 percent of the electorate voted; therefore, for the people, these elections are not valid, are not legitimate.

Fourth [as heard], from before 29 November to the present, a number of repressive actions against democratic and union forces have been occurring, and these actions constitute a violation of human rights in Haiti. Everyone feels that the failure of the 29 November elections have set Haiti back politically; and they see that a series of important macoutes have returned to power.

The COPPPAL mission is leaving Haiti very concerned over the deterioration of Haiti's political life. Peace can only return to Haiti upon cessation of repression and intimidation, and when the right of the democratic forces represented by the opposition to participate and to organize is recognized.

In conclusion, they wish to express the Latin American and Caribbean democratic community's solidarity with the Haitian people; and they hope that the Haitian people can get back on the path of democracy very quickly.

This is, roughly, their impression after their visit to Haiti. They will write the final report in Panama and will submit it to COPPPAL. They will also send copies to all political parties, whether opposition parties or ruling parties.

They answered some questions from journalists. When asked what, concretely, they were going to do to help Haiti, they answered that they had not come to interfere in Haitian affairs; and that COPPPAL cannot decide this by itself—that the people itself must take action to extricate itself from the situation in which it currently finds itself.

The journalists also asked how the delegation felt about the CNG's refusal to meet with them. They said simply that they interpreted this refusal the same way they interpreted 29 November.

That is, roughly, what was said at the news conference the COPPPAL delegation gave at the airport before leaving Haiti.

FNC Member Disappears, Reportedly Arrested

FL041629 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Excerpt] (Etzer Dorsainvil), founder and president of the National Federation of Unemployed Technicians, Fenatech, and a member of the National Concerted Action Front [FNC], left his home at around 1600 on Sunday, 31 January, and has not been heard from since. He had said he was going to Saint Gerard Church.

Several people who know him assert that a group of men in civilian clothing arrested him on Sunday afternoon in the environs of St Raphael [a building formerly housing a pharmacy], in Carrefour Feuilles.

We note that a group of men in civilian dress had already arrested (Dorsainvil) once, on 31 December 1987, in a public transport vehicle on Delmas road. He was seriously beaten at that time, and regained consciousness at the Dessalines Barracks. [passage omitted]

Radio Soleil Report on Unity Committee

FI031620 [Editorial Report] Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole at 1200 GMT on 2 February carries the following material, with each paragraph read by alternating male and female speakers. There is no identification or comment of any sort accompanying the item, which is included as part of Radio Soleil's regularly scheduled newscast:

"A leader who is willing to climb to power on the bodies of the victims of 29 November will continue to walk over dead bodies to remain in power.

"Remember Francois Duvalier.

"A president who seizes power against the will of the people cannot establish democracy.

"Remember Francois Duvalier.

"A government which comes to power by violating the Constitution has already chosen to govern by force.

"Remember the Duvalier government.

"Senators, deputies and magistrates who got their jobs by wheeling and dealing with a handful of shysters will be obliged to conspire with these shysters to trample the Constitution, loot the country, and abuse the population.

"Remember how things were under Duvalier.

"Truly, the Haitian people have been being given a lesson since 1957. Pumpkin plants do not produce calabash. Dishonest elections do not produce democracy.

"To avoid such a misfortune, various organizations on 1 January formed the Unity Committee for the Respect of the Constitution. This committee is made up of Catholic and Protestant church organizations, labor unions, peasants groups, professional associations, neighborhood committees, etc. The committee invites all organizations and individuals who do not want misfortune for Haiti to form a great chain of solidarity for the respect of the Constitution, for the respect of the Haitian people."

Guatemala

Presidency on U.S. Congress Contra Aid Vote

PA050350 Buenos Aires REUTER in Spanish 0209 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] Guatemala City, 4 Feb (REUTER)—The Guatemalan Government stated today that the refusal of the U.S. Congress to continue aiding the Nicaraguan Resistance "serves to reinforce President Vinicio Cerezo's policy of active neutrality in the Central American conflict. [no end quotation marks as received]

An official statement released by the Presidency reaffirmed that President Cerezo's stance "fundamentally aims at seeking peace in the region through diplomatic channels. This stance has become clear in the Esquipulas I and II meetings and in the recent summit meeting of Central American presidents in San Jose, Costa Rica."

The statement concludes that "it also hopes that the major powers will allow Central Americans to find more adequate solutions to improve their well-being. This would lead to the establishment of a full democracy and a better future for our peoples."

Honduras

Azcona 'Dissatisfied' With U.S. House Vote

PA041747 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1544 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 4 Feb (ACAN-EFE)—Honduran President Jose Azcona Hoyo is dissatisfied with the decision of the U.S. Congress to reject the $36.25 million in aid for the Nicaraguan contras, but he respects that decision.

This statement was issued by Lisandro Quesada, press secretary for Azcona.

"We are not going to issue an official statement on the decision of the U.S. Congress because this a domestic decision made by the officials of another country, which we respect regardless of whether we agree with it or not," said Quesada.

Azcona noted that the military pressure of the contras has forced the Sandinists to make democratic changes and negotiate a cease-fire with the rebels.

Last night the U.S. House of Representatives rejected by a vote of 219 to 211 the $36.25 million that President Ronald Reagan requested for the Nicaraguan rebels. Of this total, (?$3.6 million) was earmarked for weapons, and the remainder for humanitarian assistance.

Quesada emphasized that in any case, Honduras will, with its own resources, face whatever problems may arise along its border with Nicaragua "such as the increase in Nicaraguan refugees in our country and other consequences that will occur afterwards."

"We will prevent the contras from entering the national territory, the confrontations between them and the Sandinists along the border, and the penetration of communist ideology that the Sandinists are seeking to install in Central America," he added.

On 2 February, General Humberto Regalado Hernandez, chief of the Honduran Armed Forces, sent a letter to Senator Jim Wright [title as received] at the House of Representatives telling him that there will be no peace in Central America "as long as centers of disturbance and sanctuaries for subversion and political crime-for-export exist."

In the letter, Regalado hinted it is important for the United States and Honduras that aid for the contras be approved.

"The Armed Forces are firmly convinced that the decisions of our governments take precedence over purely military initiatives, and that this [military] power is nothing more than a complement to the other instruments of the national security policy. Therefore, coherent thought and action must prevail to prevent surprises, the endangering of national security, and threats to regional peace," he added.

Finally, Regalado told Wright that he was "vehemently" praying to God to "inspire the hearts and minds of the honorable representatives of the House and the Senate to give them wisdom in their legislative actions now and in the future, and that He might contribute to maintaining the United States of America as the bastion of peace and democratization in the world."

Nicaragua

Ortega Views U.S. Congress Contra Aid Vote

PA042200 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 1812 GMT 4 Feb 88

[News conference by President Daniel Ortega with national and international reporters at the Presidential Palace in Managua—live]

[Text] [Ortega] Good morning, Nicaraguan people. The rejection of funding for the war against Nicaragua by a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives was a decision that should contribute to eradicating the illegal policy of force which the United States has been promoting and continues to defend, regardless of international law.

The rejection by the House of funds for the war against Nicaragua should also contribute to opening relations between the United States and Nicaragua. In my 20 January letter to President Reagan, I told him that our differences can be overcome.

All sensible Nicaraguans share this opinion: I am speaking of the great majority of the Nicaraguan people. This opinion is also shared by the Latin American countries, Canada, the European states, and the entire international community.

I recently visited some European countries that are friends and allies of the United States, and they also share this opinion. They believe the existing problems created by the U.S. policy against Nicaragua can be resolved.

The rejection by the majority of the House for funding the war against Nicaragua should encourage the U.S. Government to abide by the 27 June 1986 ruling of the International Court of Justice. This rejection should also make the United States respect the peoples' right to self-determination once and for all.

To speak of respect for the peoples' right to self-determination is to speak of respect for the peace agreement that the Central American presidents signed on 7 August 1987 and ratified in January 1988. To speak of respect for the peoples' right to self-determination is also to speak of respect for the will of the Latin American governments, including the Contadora and Support Groups, which for many years have arduously worked for peace in Central America. We are talking about respect for the Third World countries' right to self-determination.

The vote by the House—the majority of the House, because we cannot deny a reality: 211 representatives voted for the war, and 219 voted for a peaceful solution... [changes thought] in other words, the vote [against funding the contras] was not by the entire House, but by a majority of it. The majority of the House voted for a peaceful solution to the Central American conflict.

This majority vote in the U.S. Congress should help the Central American governments that signed the Esquipulas agreement to totally fulfill it. Nicaragua honored the agreement. In fact, a new meeting between the representatives of the U.S. Government—the contras—[and the Nicaraguan Government] is scheduled to be held in Guatemala on 10 February to discuss the cease-fire problem, which is linked to disarmament and amnesty.

Nicaragua is complying with each and every point that we signed on 7 August 1987 and that we ratified on 16 January in Costa Rica. Under these circumstances, we hope that the U.S. Government will respect the wishes of the Central American presidents, that the U.S. Government will not continue sending emissaries such as General Powell to threaten the Central American presidents and to try to destory the peace agreement, and that it will give the Central American governments the opportunity and the independence to fulfill the peace plan. We hope this will permit the Salvadoran Government to comply with the agreement, because the Salvadoran Government has not done so.

On 16 January, the Salvadoran Government ratified the document that stipulates, among other things, that Salvadoran territory would not be used for aggression against other Central American states. However, Salvadoran territory continues to be used by the United States to attack Nicaragua.

On 16 January, the Salvadoran Government pledged in Costa Rica to hold talks with the Salvadoran revolutionaries to work for peace in El Salvador. So far, we know of no meeting between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN, but we do know the FMLN has been willing to hold such talks with the Salvadoran Government. Since 16 January, the FMLN has issued very clear statements in this regard.

There are other points concerning human rights, civil rights, and democracy—which were discussed by the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission [CIVS]—that the Salvadoran Government should comply with. I believe President Duarte is willing to fulfill them, and I hope President Duarte keeps his word of honor, which was given in Guatemala on 7 August 1987, and again on 16 January in Costa Rica.

We also hope that the Honduran Government will comply with what it wrote about the peace plan. No one is unaware that Honduran territory continues to be used as a base for aggression against Nicaragua. Proof of this is obvious. The plane that was recently shot down had taken off from Honduras' Swan Island, a place that is operated by the CIA. Logistics there are organized by the CIA, and the area is guarded by Honduran Army forces.

There are many camps and bases of aggression against Nicaragua in Honduran territory. The United States should withdraw those bases, and the Honduran Government should comply with the accords by expelling those mercenary forces that are occupying Honduran territory.

There are other matters that the CIVS took into account concerning Honduras: matters relating to democracy, freedom of labor unions, and human rights. The agreement also encompasses matters such as democracy and human rights, which we hope Honduras will comply with, so there will not be murders like that which took place on 14 January, the day before the Costa Rica meeting, when a human rights activist, a vice president

of the Human Rights Commission, was murdered in Honduras. The week before, he had testified to the CIVS and had been threatened with death by certain Honduran military personnel.

The same applies to all the Central American states. Where the CIVS has made recommendations, there should be a willingness to comply with them.

The vote by a majority of the U.S. Congress against approving further funds for the war should help the peace plan become a reality. We should all comply.

We have been extending our hand, and we extend it again to the Nicaraguans involved with the counterrevolution. We urge them to take advantage of the opportunity to attain peace that the Esquipulas agreement offers. We urge them to accept an immediate cease-fire, disarmament, and amnesty with a security mechanism that will guarantee respect for their rights at the time they lay down their weapons and accept the amnesty. Their relocation to another country also can be arranged, if they so desire.

The vote by a majority of Congress on the night of 3 February was a vote that expressed agreement with what has been a unanimous cry of the international community favoring a negotiated solution and rejecting a military solution. This, however, does not mean that the war in Nicaragua is over, or that it is about to end. The reply of the current U.S. Government is very clear: President Reagan is meeting with the NSC [National Security Council], looking for ways to continue the war against Nicaragua. President Reagan can try again to change this congressional vote and seek funds from the U.S. Congress, because the doors to Congress are not completely shut. Therefore, President Reagan can request funds for war by using ordinary methods. He can use ordinary methods to obtain funds for a war. Furthermore, there is talk that in the next few days, an attempt will be made to obtain the approval of humanitarian aid; and here the United States will probably try to look for ways to obtain war funding disguised as so-called humanitarian aid. The only humanitarian aid the Central American presidents consider permissible is aid that will contribute to relocating those who lay down their arms and join the peace process.

Relocating and moving those people—that is the only type of acceptable humanitarian aid. Other kinds of so-called humanitarian aid, such as that which was being approved for President Reagan by Congress until recently, do nothing more than exacerbate the war. This is because [the aid] represents logistics, clothing, boots, and food for those who are criminally attacking the Nicaraguan people.

The basic condition for genuine humanitarian aid is defined by the Central American presidents, and that condition is agreeable to the people. Assuming there are no longer any armed groups, the aim would then be to offer humanitarian aid to relocate those people and help them find jobs. Only within these terms would humanitarian aid, by respecting the agreement of the Central American presidents and contributing to the peace process, be acceptable.

If other types of humanitarian aid are approved, the situation will not improve. This would imply yielding to warmongering positions and not respecting the will of the Central American presidents.

The vote of a majority in the Congress last night was a vote of hope. The Nicaraguan people have been and are full of hope, because they want peace. However, the Nicaraguan people are defending their right to peace with their blood. We will not lower our guard; we Nicaraguans cannot afford to lower our guard in our struggle against the terrorism of the mercenary forces.

Over the past days, while the U.S. Congress was debating the aid issue, mercenaries were attacking civilian targets. They attacked means of transportation and killed civilians.

War is here, and it continues to be present. It has not been eradicated, although a majority in the U.S. Congress yesterday voted against approving new funds. Children in our fatherland continue to be killed. Workers, women, and the Nicaraguan people continue to be killed.

We will have to continue to endure and face this tragedy—this war—as long as the U.S. leaders insist on continuing it. We have now been at war for 7 years. There have been more than 50,000 casualties and more than $3.6 billion in losses to the Nicaraguan economy. These have been 7 years of sacrifice, pain, and suffering for the Nicaraguan people.

We are not concealing the social and economic effects of war on Nicaraguan life. We do not hide the fact that the Nicaraguan economy is seriously impaired because it is suffering the direct impact of war; war directly damages the Nicaraguan economy. This includes attacks on peasant cooperatives, and the destruction of health centers, schools, houses, tractors, agricultural equipment given to the peasants, means of transportation, bridges, and electric towers. Logically, these attacks mean greater suffering for the Nicaraguan people.

The economic embargo policy decreed by the U.S. Government against Nicaragua is still alive. It has not disappeared despite the majority vote last night in the U.S. Congress. That embargo continues. Supply flights for mercenary forces continue. Supply flights from various points in Central America continue. The CIA continues to be involved in all these activities. U.S. troops are headquartered in Honduras and are serving to support mercenary activities. They are also threatening the Nicaraguan people with intervention.

The Nicaraguan people have resisted during these 7 years despite suffering, because they are determined to defend the democracy that we began building for the first time in this country since 1979—a full, integral, and total democracy.

The Nicaraguan people are willing to continue suffering deprivation and difficulties while defending their interests. I repeat, the end of this war does not depend on the Nicaraguan people. It depends on the attitude taken by the U.S. leaders, because if President Reagan, in the meeting he is holding right now with the NSC, reaches the conclusion that it is time for a change of policy, that it is time to correct mistakes, that it is time to end the war and seek peace, then there would be the possibility of peace. If President Reagan reaches the conclusion today that this policy of war must end, that a cease-fire must be reached in the next meeting on 10 January [as heard] in Guatemala, that the contras must be disarmed and must accept amnesty, and that the U.S. Government must decide to hold direct talks with Nicaragua so we can discuss security matters and reach verifiable agreements, then the Nicaraguan people's future and relations between the United States and Nicaragua, Central America, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the international community will take a different course.

It is very unlikely, however, that there would be this miracle through which the U.S. President would become a man of peace. He must surely be analyzing different plans to continue the war against Nicaragua. In other words, so the number of dead in Nicaragua will continue to increase; so the number of murdered children in Nicaragua will continue to increase; so the number of mutilated children in Nicaragua will continue to increase; and so the sorrow of Nicaraguan mothers will continue to increase.

The Nicaraguan people cannot lower their guard in this struggle for peace, because the war will end when the U.S. Government accepts a cease-fire; when the U.S. Government gives up its policy of force and threats, even the use of U.S. military power to invade Nicaragua; and when the U.S. Government decides to participate in a direct dialogue to discuss security matters. [The people cannot lower their guard] as long as the warmongering attitude of the U.S. Government does not change; as long as the U.S. Government does not heed the appeal of the international community, the majority vote of the U.S. Congress, and the appeal of the U.S. people—who reject that terrorist policy—as long as the U.S. Government does not respect international legal norms; as long as the U.S. Government does not change its warmongering attitude; as long as the counterrevolutionaries do not accept a cease-fire, turn in their weapons, and seek amnesty; and as long as the territory of neighboring states is used to launch an attack against Nicaragua. In other words, as long as the war continues—and the war continues despite last night's vote—all Nicaraguans must remain massively and permanently mobilized in the total defense of the revolution, in the military defense of the revolution, and in the defense of the national economy to achieve the total defeat of the mercenary forces.

We are sure that the world's peoples and governments that advocate international legal order and the peoples' right to freedom will also remain alert and (?civilized). We mean specifically the U.S. people, who have been wise enough to turn down their government's interventionist policy. We expect a similar position to be assumed by those of the Nicaraguan opposition, who have cast their lot with the U.S. interventionist policy. We expect them to correct their course. We expect them to accept the principles of democracy established by the Nicaraguan revolution. We expect them to accept the political pluralism and the public rights guaranteed by the Nicaraguan revolution. We expect them to understand that a peaceful and democratic process cannot be advanced by means of counterrevolutionaries and military actions, because this would be incompatible with peace.

War counteracts peace. The mercenary forces make democracy impossible in Nicaragua. Therefore, anyone genuinely interested in peace and democracy in Nicaragua should break any relationship with the mercenary forces. These are illegal forces, because they respond to an illegal armed plan, which has been thus described by the International Court of Justice. We have accomplished a profound revolution in Nicaragua so that full democracy can become a reality for the first time in the country's history. This is the full democracy we never hear about—a full democracy repeatedly denied by conservative governments and leaders backed, financed, and armed by several U.S. administrations.

We do live in a complete democracy at present. Now we do enjoy total freedom of expression in our country. Therefore, this is the time to strengthen national unity to take care of national interests, to protect this broad and deep democracy that the Nicaraguan people achieved on 19 July 1979. This entails a clear rejection of the interventionist policy. This means to close ranks round the military and economic defense of the revolution, because the national interest is at stake.

The Nicaraguan Government will continue to politically defend the Nicaraguan people's right to peace. All Nicaraguans will continue to defend the nation. At this historic moment in the struggle for a peaceful future, we invite every Nicaraguan, including the opposition, to defend the national interest, even on the battlefield. We invite them to defend the nation's interest in a legal framework. This right to peace was achieved by workers, peasants, producers, patriotic businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals, and all the Nicaraguan working people, who have defended and will continue to defend with their blood the right for life, dignity, independence, democracy, and peace, all of which are embodied in the Constitution.

This is what we had to tell the Nicaraguan people and the international community after we learned of the vote cast at the House of Representatives last night, 3 February. During the session, 219 U.S. representatives voted against financing the contras and the war, while 211 voted for the war. The U.S. President is hurt. By now he must have concluded his meeting with the National Security Council to devise new ways of continuing the war against the Nicaraguan people.

I will gladly answer two or three questions on this topic.

[Reporter] You have said that Nicaragua has complied with the peace plan. However, several opposition leaders here in Nicaragua say that you have not fully complied with the plan. For example, they mention that amnesty has not been granted. I would like to know if within the context of the vote, the Nicaraguan Government is planning—for example—to take new steps, perhaps the amnesty that has already been promised.

[Ortega] The opposition politicians are not the only ones who are qualified to judge if Nicaragua has complied or not. During the 7 August 1987 meeting, the Central American presidents appointed an International Verification and Follow-Up Commission composed of the UN secretary general, the OAS secretary general, the Contadora and Support Groups, and the five Central American foreign ministers. This commission toured the Central American countries early in January and presented a report to the presidents' meeting containing an evaluation and recommendations. That is the report we are taking into consideration.

[Reporter] Mr President, the editorialist of the Reagan administration's newspaper in Nicaragua [LA PRENSA] wrote an editorial yesterday, shortly before the beginning of the debate that resulted in a negative vote. The editorialist was incapable of speaking out against President Reagan's request. This editorialist is a poor disciple of Machiavelli. He said that the Nicaraguan Government has asked Washington to solve the Nicaraguan conflict, and, therefore, Nicaragua has become a U.S. colony. In other words, Nicaragua is no longer a Soviet colony, as President Reagan insists, but rather it is a colony of the United States in the sense that it has violated its principles relating to Nicaragua's desire for independence....

[Ortega, interrupting] I think it would be a good idea to send to the United States that criterion, because if Nicaragua is now a colony of the United States, then there is no reason for the U.S. Government to continue waging war against Nicaragua, and it would thus have lost its justification to wage a war.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] they are making a tremendous contradiction. They said that Nicaragua was subjected to the interests of Moscow and Cuba, and now they say that it is subjected to...[changes thought]. [Words indistict] the interests so that Washington will resort to that in the debate. This is an attempt to create confusion among the Nicaraguan people.

[Ortega] The problem is that they [in the United States] are the ones who are confused. The people are not confused.

[Reporter] They want to impose their opinions on this...

[Ortega, interrupting] Definitely, they think they are the only ones entitled to an opinion. The people are not confused.

[(Ibarra)] Mr President, my name is (Ibarra) from VANGUARDIA, Barcelona, Spain. Will last night's vote influence the new round of talks to begin 10 February in Guatemala? Will it change the Nicaraguan Government's stand?

[Ortega] We are complying to the letter with the Guatemala agreements. We will go to this meeting on 10 February precisely to carry out the Guatemala agreements. It is up to the U.S. Government to decide whether it will accept a cease-fire. We are seriously committed to an effective cease-fire, to a disarmament, amnesty, and we will seriously be on our way to peace when all this becomes effective. We are going to the 10 February meeting with this determination and willingness.

[Reporter] Commander, you mentioned that the Salvadoran Government has not complied yet, and that El Salvador is still helping the contras. I would like to ask you: First, how is the Salvadoran Government helping? Are there flights taking off from there or what? Second, can you state that the Salvadoran guerrillas are not receiving any support from Nicaragua?

[Ortega] We spoke very clearly concerning that point during the 15-16 January meeting in Costa Rica. We talked about this subject with President Duarte and President Azcona; and President Arias and President Cerezo were present. I insisted that it was important that the mechanisms of verification and follow-up we had proposed during the 7 August meeting be maintained. On the other hand, President Duarte told me our word was sufficient. I told him our word was not enough, that it was best to entrust verification to the mechanisms, because the mechanisms could assure compliance with such sensitive points as the ones you have mentioned and in instances in which there are mutual accusations. Therefore, I would answer your question as I answered President Duarte. We are accusing each other. It is not true that our respective countries are being used for any activities against another country. Honduras is saying this, El Salvador is saying it, Nicaragua is saying this; all countries are saying this.

Thus, we are challenging each other's words. That is not enough. Therefore, it is important that a verification mechanism be established if it is not possible right now to take advantage of the verification mechanism that was initially set up with the United Nations, the OAS, the Contadora and Support Groups, and the Central Americans. There was some concern over the report presented by the commission. El Salvador and Honduras even issued communiques challenging and publicly rejecting that report.

However, in the final document issued on 16 January, we said that the verification mechanisms should be organized with the participation of the region's countries, of countries outside the region, and with the participation of specialized international organizations. Thus, the Central Americans should take this step very shortly. I will try to contact the Central American presidents about this. We must immediately organize a verification and follow-up mechanism.

Insofar as this is a regional effort, the Contadora and Support Groups, the United Nations, and the OAS should participate. Something new this time would be the participation of Europe and Canada, because they have voiced their willingness to participate, to contribute to the efforts for the verification and follow-up of the agreements.

That is the only way to really certify who is fulfilling and who is not fulfilling certain points of the agreements. Significant differences still exist.

[Rioseco] My name is Pedro Rioseco from PRENSA LATINA. Commander, my question deals precisely with that issue. In view of the new situation created by last night's vote, will you call the rest of the Central American presidents to a summit to put the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission into action, with the participation of Europe? What steps are your government planning to take to guarantee the effective fulfillment of Esquipulas and the simulteneity agreement and to make sure the fulfillment is verifiable by all the signatory countries?

[Ortega] Yes, I will immediately get in touch with the rest of the Central American presidents to implement one of the points we agreed on on 16 January, because as we have stated, we made a promise and since we did we must honor it. We made a promise, because we are willing to bring peace to Central America. Our peoples are demanding that peace. The verification and follow-up mechanism is essential. We stated this in the 16 January document. It is an essential mechanism. Therefore, we must immediately implement that mechanism with the participation of the countries and organizations I mentioned in order to have a reliable mechanism that will finally end all existing doubts about the fulfillment or nonfulfilment of the agreements. After all, the Central American peoples cannot be fully objective when verifying each other's fulfillment of the agreements, because we are all part of the problem; we cannot be both judge and jury.

[Arroyo] My name is Efrain Arroyo from San Juan, Puerto Rico Channel Two. How do you view the use of Puerto Rican territory to carry out joint military maneuvers, in which Central American situations are simulated? In addition, does Nicaragua represent a real threat to U.S. security?

[Ortega] We obviously do not represent any danger to U.S. security. However, the United States is determined to try to destroy the Nicaraguan revolution. Those exercises carried out in Puerto Rico are well known. The United States has also simultaneously carried out maneuvers in Puerto Rico, Honduras, the Canal Zone, and in U.S. territory. In those manuevers the United States even simulates an invasion of Nicaragua. Among the U.S. Administration's options that President Reagan threatened to use if no funds were approved was to use U.S. troops against Nicaragua. That is why we cannot rule out this danger—this use of U.S. troops against Nicaragua.

[Reporter] Mr President, after last night's events, is Nicaragua considering the possibility of taking new initiatives to hold bilateral talks with the United States?

[Ortega] I sent a letter to President Reagan and I hope he will show an understanding attitude. I hope he understands he can help build true peace by ending his policy of war and by seeking a dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government on security topics. That way he will truly promote and support the Central American efforts for peace and democracy. If President Reagan understands that is important and if he gives up his policy of force, we will be facing a new situation. However, we have had no positive reaction from President Reagan to the letter in which I suggested that we meet to begin peace talks.

[Reporter] President Ortega, according to your statements, the future is very difficult to predict. First, what will happen to the agreements if Honduras, El Salvador, and those involved in Esquipulas do not comply with them? Who will verify compliance? I know you said something about this, but I would like you to be more precise. What will happen if the others do not comply with the agreement? Second, do you still fear that because the U.S. Administration is being cornered something leading to an intervention could happen?

I believe the dangers of provocation and intervention are always present. I think this threat will never disappear as long as the U.S. Administration's aggressive attitude prevails.

As for the fulfillment of the peace plan, we demand that all countries comply with it. Honduras, El Salvador, and all of the Central American countries must comply with

the peace plan. We must all work to fulfill the peace plan. I believe the necessary conditions exist for the peace plan to be fulfilled. It is a matter of being a little firm, despite the U.S. Government's pressures, to fulfill the peace plan. Presently I would not like to speculate on what will happen if the peace plan is not fulfilled. We must all work hard to comply with the peace plan and to draft as soon as possible a mechanism for the verification and follow-up of the Esquipulas agreements.

[Reporter] Mr President, [word indistinct] according to some political parties, there is no democracy in Nicaragua. As an example of this they mention the public security law, the communications law, and amnesty, which is yet to be granted in Nicaragua. What are you waiting for after [words indistinct] in Congress last night to democratize this country?

[Ortega] Well, I wish those political parties that say there is no democracy in Nicaragua spoke that way during Somoza's times. Some of the opposition party leaders used to be Somozists themselves. They have a very different concept of democracy. They want a Somozist-style democracy. They would like to see a Somozist-type democracy back in our fatherland. They cannot see democracy in this country because workers and peasants have more rights than ever before and because for the first time elections have taken place with the participation of seven political parties. They refuse to see that. They refuse to see all the open, democratic political opportunities in Nicaragua—where political leaders are not assassinated. In some of our neighboring countries you can see how opposition party leaders disappear. Rightist groups in El Salvador have assassinated nearly 600 members of the Christian Democratic Party, which is presently in power. During all the years of fighting in that country I do not know how many revolutionaries, peasants, and workers have been killed there. [words indistinct].

That is not the type of democracy we want for this country. We do not want a regime where priests or bishops are killed. That is not advisable for Nicaragua. We do not want a regime where human rights leaders are killed and people disappear. I believe that type of democracy would not be advisable for Nicaragua. We prefer a democracy where people's lives, safety, and security are respected. In Nicaragua priests, bishops, journalists, and labor leaders are not killed.

Those who say there is a lack of democracy in Nicaragua say it because they are simply trying to hide the obvious.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct]

[Ortega] We would first have to consult the people. Otherwise we would be making an arbitrary decision. In 1984 the people participated in elections. They voted for the FSLN. Therefore, the Constitution has been drafted by most of the people. To amend the Constitution we would first have to consult the people and call for a referendum. We will not amend the Constitution simply because some minority parties decide to do so. We would be acting in an antidemocratic manner if we did that. We would also be showing a lack of respect for the people's will if we did that.

[Preston) Mr President, I am Julia Preston of THE WASHINGTON POST. I would like you to clarify your call to the Nicaraguan people to defend the Sandinist revolution. I would like to know if last night's vote by the U.S. Congress could lead to a reduction of military aid from the Soviet bloc? Under what circumstances would the Nicaraguan Government consider a reduction of this aid?

[Ortega] There is a very clear point in the 7 August agreement with Contadora that says the Central American countries will discuss military and security matters. The Central American countries will also discuss matters that have to do with the presence of foreign military advisers, with foreign military maneuvers, and with foreign military installations. That is to say, with all foreign military presence. We do not want any type of foreign military presence in Central America.

[Reporter] In your speech, we do not find any sign of optimism. We heard words of caution as if the situation was very serious. Could you explain to us why? How do you perceive things? Why are you so cautious on one hand and on the other hand you talk about the effect of this vote on relations between the United States and Latin America? What can you tell us about this, especially since the San Jose meeting, where Contadora was—let us say—divided?

[Ortega] Yes. Well, the situation is still critical; the vote has not changed the situation, because the vote can influence the peace process. The vote can have an influence by strengthening the Central American peace efforts. The vote can have an influence by strengthening the peace efforts exerted by Latin America, the Contadora Group, and the Support Group. The vote can have an influence by strengthening the EEC's position in favor of peace and against a military solution in the Central American region. However, the vote does not make the war disappear; the war continues because it is sponsored, financed, directed, and organized by the U.S. Administration. This is not the first time that the U.S. Congress voted to reject additional funds for the contras. Of course, this case is somewhat different, and we will not underestimate its importance.

The situation has not been defined, meaning that not everyone has opted for peace, because there is an important element involved in this case: The U.S. Government. If the U.S. President issues a statement to the U.S. people and international community after his meeting with the National Security Council saying that he has decided to cut all kinds of military and financial aid to the mercenary forces, to participate in a direct dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government in order to review

security matters, and to tell the contras that they must accept a cease-fire, then we can state that we have advanced toward the achievement of peace. However, we cannot talk about advancing toward the achievement of peace under these circumstances.

We are withstanding a war while exerting ourselves to achieve peace. There are proposals to achieve peace; there is a willingness to achieve peace; but we face an enormous obstacle that is even trying to eliminate the efforts of the Contadora and Support Groups from the Latin American endeavor to attain self-determination, independence, and sovereignty in Central America, and to safeguard the interests of Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. Government wants to remove the Contadora and Support Groups, so it must not be happy about Europe's participation in the peace efforts.

Thus, this is a crucial moment: The forces are divided, and there is a tendency to advocate negotiation; but there is also a possibility that negotiation efforts will be countered and a military solution will be imposed. We have to consider this possibility, because a military solution has not been ruled out yet. That is the option which the U.S. Government continues to advocate. The U.S. Government—which is a military and a world-class economic power—advocates a military solution against a nation like Nicaragua; thus, all the efforts exerted by other nations will logically conflict against that policy, because the U.S. Government distorts and affects those efforts.

[Reporter] Comrade President, you say that the situation is difficult. Then why are you still so generous? Why did you release Denby, the mercenary? Why do you not enforce the revolutionary laws in a just way? Why does Nicaragua have to give in so much while, as you have pointed out, the territory of other countries is still being used to attack our people?

[Ortega] We seriously want to implement the peace agreements, precisely to work for the achievement of peace. You must understand that normal procedures were followed in Denby's case. We have laws and judges like any other country, and the judges have the autonomy to handle a case and either issue a sentence or acquit the prisoner. We cannot interfere in that case, because this is a legal state. In other words, we have established a legal state for the first time, and we must respect all of that.

[Collins] Mr President, Peter Collins of ABC. Today THE NEW YORK TIMES says that the Soviet Government has constantly suggested to the U.S. Government that Moscow may reduce its military support to the Nicaraguan Government if the United States is willing to cut its aid to all the Central American states. My question is: Did you discuss this topic during your meeting with Mr Shevardnadze in Helsinki?

[Ortega] No, I have not seen Mr Shevardnadze. I met with Mr Gorbachev in November last year. The Central American presidents have been working—through the Esquipulas agreement and the plan of the Contadora Group—on a proposal to limit weapons in the Central American region, and to seek what we have called a reasonable balance of power in the Central American region. This is logically a sovereign decision of the Central American governments. This position [of a military balance] has been supported and shared by the USSR. I spoke with Mr Gorbachev about this in November, and I told him we had signed the peace accords. I told him we were willing to find a reasonable balance of military strength, to limit the supply of weapons to Central America, and to remove any foreign military presence from Central America. He expressed his support for Nicaragua's stand. Very well, thank you.

Ramirez Calls Vote 'Victory'

PA041650 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 1444 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Interview with Vice President Sergio Ramirez by an unidentified reporter from the Spanish radio station Cadena de Ondas Populares Espanolas in Managua on 3 February—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] The U.S. House of Representatives has rejected President Ronald Reagan's request for contra aid. How does Managua view this important news?

[Ramirez] We view this as a victory resulting from the Nicaraguan people's perseverance in defending their rights as an independent, sovereign nation. It is also a victory for the U.S. people, who never agreed with the illegal activities carried out against Nicaragua. We believe we now have a new opportunity for peace in Central America.

I want to tell you that Nicaragua's official reaction will be announced at noon tomorrow. At that time, we will announce what the House vote means to us.

[Reporter] Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, who is the architect of the Central American peace plan, has just told this radio station that the Central Americans already possess the necessary tools for building peace in the region.

[Ramirez] We have always believed it is very important to stop a congressional vote in favor of war, of bleeding Central America, of terror, of murder, and of crimes that have been committed here on behalf of the freedoms that President Reagan has been proclaiming. We believe the House vote contributes to peace.

[Reporter] It is evident that the House decision will push the face-to-face talks between the Sandinist government and the Nicaraguan contras into a new phase.

[Ramirez] We have announced we are prepared to go to the upcoming round of talks in Guatemala as of 10 February. We hope the counterrevolutionaries are willing to accept the cease-fire terms established in the Esquipulas agreement.

[Reporter] Is the Nicaraguan Government prepared to make some specific decisions in this regard?

[Ramirez] I repeat that tomorrow President Daniel Ortega will make an official statement. The Nicaraguan Government will then announce its position on this vote and its significance for the Esquipulas agreement.

[Reporter] Mr Vice President, Alfonso Robelo has told this station that he doubts there will be any democratization in Nicaragua, and that it is now up to those who have believed in the Managua regime—Arias and Felipe Gonzalez—to pressure the Ortega regime to realize the democratization process.

[Ramirez] The problem is that the counterrevolutionaries have always linked their military activities to support from Congress. If they were so certain of the justness of their cause, they would not be so sad over Congress' not giving them any further support. This is not the problem, however. The problem is the search for peace. The Nicaraguan Government will make every effort to consolidate peace in the middle of a war that has been imposed on us from abroad and that has been financed from abroad.

The outlook is different now, and we believe we have better conditions for attaining peace.

[Reporter] Will there be a cease-fire along the border with Honduras?

[Ramirez] We hope that common sense prevails and that the counterrevolutionaries who have been organized, directed, and financed by the Reagan administration will now understand it is necessary to reach a cease-fire and to have peace in Nicaragua. That is what we want.

Borge Views Issue Prior to Congressional Vote

PA042210 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1930 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The Sandinist people's revolution will continue to survive no matter what the U.S. Congress decides, Nicaraguan Minister of Interior Tomas Borge has stated in this capital. Borge said anything can happen in the United States, but that the Sandinist revolution will never be defeated. These were Borge's statements concerning the discussion by the U.S. Congress on contra aid.

Borge made these statements before the results of the Senate vote were made known, and during a seminar on labor laws held in Managua.

Borge noted that the Nicaraguan Government has prepared different options to face whatever objections the U.S. congressmen may have. As for these ideas, Borge said that he would not make any further comment, but added that if he were to make them, they would always be prudent, courageous, brave, mature, firm, and would lead to peace.

Some say we have made too many or all of the concessions, Borge stated, but we have done our share to achieve peace. Borge also noted that Nicaragua has complied with the Esquipulas II accords that were agreed upon by the Central American presidents in Guatemala City on 7 August 1987.

Borge also commented that he hoped the decision of the U.S. Congress will contribute to peace.

Contra Leaders React to Aid Package Defeat

Position in Talks 'Weakened'

PA042238 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2034 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Miami, Florida, 4 Feb (EFE)—Today contra leaders stated that the negotiating position of the anti-Sandinist delegation that will conduct cease-fire talks with the Nicaraguan Government has been "considerably weakened."

Last night, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected, after a heated debate, a White House request for $36.25 million in aid to the contras, who have been attempting to overthrow the Sandinist government for the past 7 years.

Adolfo Calero and Alfredo Cesar, two of the leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance, admitted that the vote "will probably demoralize" not only the insurgent groups, but also the domestic civil opposition in Nicaragua.

In a communique released today in Miami, they stated that "this is a serious setback to the cause of democracy and the Central American peace process."

They insisted that their main responsibility is to reach "an honorable cease-fire agreement and to maintain the integrity of our forces during the upcoming trial period." They asked the U.S. Congress to act "quickly to clarify the true significance of the vote."

The communique asked: "Is the United States going to entrust the future of Nicaragua and the entire region to uncertain promises, or will Congress find a way to assure the democratic forces of Central America that they can count on the world's most powerful democracy?"

If Congress does not act quickly, added the communique, it has two options: "get used to a new tyranny or, find other, perhaps more radical, ways to resist the dictatorship."

The anti-Sandinist leaders admitted that most of the congressmen who voted against the measure "were trying to encourage the peace process," and they expressed gratitude for the "humanitarian aid" soon to be granted.

The leaders recalled that Cuban and Soviet military aid is "still flowing in to the Sandinist regime," and indicated that their negotiating position is going to be considerably weakened at their next "face-to-face" meeting with Nicaraguan officials this month.

A spokesman revealed that the RN leadership will meet this weekend to evaluate the situation.

Robelo Views Upcoming Talks

PA050347 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0123 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] San Jose, 4 Feb (ACAN-EFE)—According to Alfonso Robelo, a member of the Nicaraguan opposition, the Sandinists will take a forceful position against the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) during the upcoming cease-fire talks in Guatemala between 10 and 12 February.

"They know that, politically speaking, they were able to deceive all those who supported them against the Somoza government." Robelo stated this is because they "got their way" in 1979 "when they betrayed the revolution, and now, "obviously, they can again deceive" those who trusted their word. [quotation marks as received]

Robelo is the only "contra" leader to reside in Costa Rica since President Oscar Arias warned contra leaders earlier this year to stop supporting the armed struggle or else leave the country.

I reside here "not to advocate war, but to promote a dialogue" to find a solution to Nicaragua's problems, Robelo told ACAN-EFE today.

The other members of the opposition hierarchy have left and are dispersed: Adolfo Calero and Alfredo Cesar traveled to Washington, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro to Miami, Aristides Sanchez to Honduras, and Azucena Ferrey is passing through this capital.

The cease-fire commissions of the two sides will meet "face-to-face" in Guatemala between 10 and 12 February, as was agreed in San Jose during the first direct meeting held on 15 and 16 January.

Calero pointed out: "We are optimistic about the meeting of the cease-fire commissions, although the FSLN will apply greater pressure to bring about the insurgents' surrender."

The Sandinists will undoubtedly adopt a "forceful stand" toward the insurgents, who have been weakened by the refusal of the U.S. Congress to grant $36.25 million in humanitarian aid. Robelo noted, however, that "we will not give up our positions."

The RN maintains that the cease-fire proposed by the Sandinists "means the surrender of the rebels" without any genuine commitments on the part of the Nicaraguan Government.

The anti-Sandinists demand the simultaneous start of a democratization process and a suspension of hostilities. This is because "if there are no changes in the political factors that brought about the war, a cease-fire will not lead to peace in the country," Robelo said.

If there are no changes in the political factors that caused the war, the objectives of the "face-to-face" dialogue will not be accomplished. The objective of the dialogue is to "end the war and bring about effective democratization."

Bermudez on Reduced Operations

PA050426 Buenos Aires REUTER in Spanish 0307 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 4 Feb (REUTER)—The military leader [Enrique Bermudez] of the contras—who until now had been supported by the United States—said today that the guerrillas will have to reduce their attacks and change tactics in order to conserve military materiel now that the U.S. House of Representatives has decided to suspend aid.

However, Bermudez stated that he spoke with several field commanders who told him that the 6-year struggle for Nicaraguan democracy must continue and that the men's morale is still high.

"[Words indistinct] demoralized. We are at war. We lost a battle, but the war continues," Bermudez commented on the telephone as he spoke from an unidentified Central American nation.

Bermudez estimated that the contras are carrying out approximately 300 attacks per month, but that they will now have to reduce the number of attacks and use their ammunition wisely.

Calero Hopeful on Future Votes

PA050334 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 2200 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 4 Feb (DAP)— The Nicaraguan "contras" reacted calmly to last night's vote by the U.S. Congress rejecting a request for $36.25 million in aid for their cause. They expressed strong optimism that they will achieve their objective in a later vote.

Adolfo Calero, top leader of the Nicaraguan Resistance [RN], said that the vote was close. He called the voting "polarized" since the U.S. Democratic and Republican congressmen voted along party lines.

Calero made his remarks to Voz de Honduras radio from Miami, in the United States. He stated that U.S. President Reagan will make another request to win approval for aid to the rebels.

Calero noted that in this vote, many moderate Democrats were committed to the group that was actively opposing the request. However, he expressed his confidence that in a second vote, these lawmakers will support the "contras." He added that the vote last night would not be "the last vote" by the representatives on the rebels' cause.

Likewise, he stated that the vote would have been favorable to the "contras" had President Reagan sent a letter to the congressmen 1 week earlier vowing to let Congress have the last word on releasing the funds for lethal aid.

Calero based his optimism on previous occasions when U.S. congressmen had voted against the aid but supported the goals of the White House in a second ballot.

Panama

Gen Paredes Views Noriega, Current Situation

PA031814 Panama City Radio Continente in Spanish 1305 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Telephone interview with General Ruben Dario Paredes by journalist and legislator Mayin Correa from "The Word" program on 3 February; place not given—live]

[Excerpts] [Correa] The Panamanian people have read your letter. As for your questions to Luis Arias [general manager of the National Bank of Panama], we assume you already know the answers; otherwise, you would not have asked them. Could you expand on this subject?

[Paredes] [Passage omitted] What I would like to demonstrate to the [Panamanian] citizens, mainly the officers, the decent officers who were under my command—I was proud to be their commander—the noncommissioned officers, sergeants, corporals, first lieutenants, and basically the troops—all of whom were born from humble women—men who are working and complying with their duties in order to give their children an education, is the fact that the current commander of the Panama Defense Forces [FDP] is using that position not only for what he is being accused of internationally, in other words, not only for actions related to the the well-known charges of drug trafficking and money laundering and other activities, including murder; I am also trying to demonstrate, with my question to Luis Alberto Arias, that I respect his reply, although I believe that it was, quote, evasive, unquote, and not courageous.

I am showing you, the rank and file and decent officers, that, in addition to the other accusations made against him, Gen Noriega was also involved in the sale of aircraft to the FDP. In other words, he received 25 percent from the deal involving the sale of that aircraft to the FDP. He received 25 percent from the sale of that helicopter to the FDP. You may recall that in his lengthy statement, Kalish said that he—Kalish—bought 50 percent of the shares of Servicios Turisticos. Kalish retained 25 percent of the shares, and, as a gift, quote, as a small gift, unquote, he gave the remaining 25 percent to Noriega. So four people own Servicios Turisticos: Kalish, Noriega, the late Cesar Rodriguez, and [Enrique "Quique"] Pretelt. By the way, I do not know where Pretelt lives now, or where he is. That is another question: Where is Pretelt?

Those four individuals make a deal by selling the plane to the FDP, and the FDP commander made money on the transaction. It was immoral, and I say so. It never occurred to me to sell even a pencil to the FDP. Never.

Now, to the point. I respect Luis Alberto Arias' reply, but I believe that it is evasive, that it lacks patriotism and real value. However, I will say nothing else; the community will know how to interpret the rest.

Regarding this point, Correa, it would be good for other Panamanians to stop being afraid and to thoroughly investigate what became of that plane, how it disappeared from Air Panama's accounting ledgers and how it was transferred to the FDP. It should be determined whether Air Panama was paid for the plane. If it was not, it was theft, because the National Bank financed part of the operation to pay the alleged sellers, the four I have mentioned, including Gen Noriega, who received 25 percent of the deal. They charged $2.2 million, and that amount was paid with the people's funds, from the National Bank. That is my reply. [passage omitted].

[Correa] Gen Paredes, is it true you are seeking asylum in an embassy?

[Paredes] No. I am not seeking asylum in any embassy, and I will not leave Panama, either. I am not just anyone walking around here. I have what this gentleman—that sugar-candy man [reference to President Eric Delvalle's sugar business], the one occupying the post of president, Nander Pitti's [Presidency minister] assistant—does not have. I have what he does not have. I am staying here. I will answer the charges after discussing with my lawyers whether I should appear at the district attorney's office tomorrow. And if they are going to put handcuffs on me, let Noriega put them on me. Let Noriega go there and put them on me himself. He must not use his underlings any more. [passage omitted]

[Correa] Gen Paredes, are you afraid? What are they accusing you of? Why are you being summoned? In connection with what matter? The accusations you made today in THE WASHINGTON TIMES and the ones you made in this interview came after your summons was issued the day before yesterday. What are they accusing you of?

[Paredes] [Passage omitted] Yesterday one of my lawyers, to whom I am very grateful because of the interest and energy with which he has undertaken my defense—I am referring to Guillermo Cochez, who is also a legislator—went with my son Ahmed to the Fifth District Attorney's office to raise the same question you raised. The district attorney did not answer. He did not say anything. He just stared and trembled.

Cochez told him: This is Gen Paredes' son, and he wants to know why his father is wanted. This man just gave my son a vacant stare and said: I have to leave, I have to leave, I have to leave. They said wait, wait. Cochez said: If I bring my client here, what guarantee do I have that he will not be handcuffed and taken away? That is when the district attorney said: I don't know, I don't know, I don't know. Cochez asked: What is he being accused of? I don't know; I cannot say, the district attorney replied. Then my lawyer, Cochez, and my son went to the Second Tribunal to arrange for bail to be posted in case there was already an arrest warrant against me. This was because three plainclothes policemen went to my house yesterday—I was still in Cerro Punta, Chiriqui Province—and asked if I was home. So it seems they have already issued the arrest warrant.

So, they went back again to arrange for the bail with this woman judge. The judge did her duty and carried out the proceedings. In these proceedings, she had to ask the district attorney in writing—which she did—for my case file, and the district attorney was legally obliged to send it over immediately so she could review it and determine the bail. Cochez and Ahmed quickly took the note to Mr Sanjur Otero of the district attorney's office.

They received an evasive answer: I am busy; some other time. In other words, the district attorney did not comply with the regulations. They violated the law, and up to this moment we have not been allowed to post bail. I therefore run the risk of being arrested because I have not been given the right to post bail. You can surmise from this that their intention is to arrest me. That is why they are denying bail. One can conclude that.

Now then, one is a human being and thinks and ponders about things, and one can imagine more or less what the reason may be. I am not being charged with the same things the Civic Crusade is being charged with. The charges against it are that it has asked for nonpayment of electricity bills, water bills, and so forth; those charges have been publicly raised already. I am not involved in this, even though I agree with it. I am not a Crusade member.

[Correa, chuckling] You have just committed that crime. They are going to fine you $10,000. [passage omitted]

[Paredes] Well, no. I think they did not like the message to the president that, well, that he has no balls. Or it may be because I read a quote from the bishops' communique. We must call the bishops and go before the district attorney's office with the bishops. They have also said that the fire at El Machetazo looks suspicious and that it must be clarified. They said so in the letter they all signed. [passage omitted] So, it must be for one of those two reasons. [passage omitted]

When I joined the FDP in 1957 as a sublieutenant, $1 was deducted from our salary each payday—that is $2 monthly—to go into the savings fund of the then-National Guard. [passage omitted]

I have learned that they have created a bank called Patria, and its manager is Vega, a former collections office [ingresos] chief. At the same time, one sees the huge money-laundering and drug-trafficking scandal. I warn all officers and the rank and file to be aware that the bank may be used to launder drug traffickers' money. Also watch to see whether this money is duly under the care of the board of directors. Since I imagine the fund is worth between $10-12 million, an honest official from the comptroller general's office must also be there. [passage omitted]

I stress all of this because, unfortunately, the institution... [changes thought] because we are witnessing something incredible, something we have not seen since the Republic's founding in 1903. We are experiencing the most difficult, crucial situation in recent memory now that the commander of such an important Panamanian institution as the FDP also serves as the kingpin or leader of a Panamanian drug-trafficking gang. This man has taken an institution of 20,000 humble, uniformed men, and is using terrorist tactics to hold it hostage. Thank God the only ones involved are the officers Blandon mentioned, because the remaining FDP members are good, humble Panamanians. We thank God there are only a few.

However, this should not continue, because corruption will trickle down to the structure's foundation, corrupting the entire institution and the entire country. If the situation continues as it has, if Noriega—and I have been telling this to him for some time—does not find a Torrijist solution, a political solution, a negotiated solution to this... [changes thought] the report from Washington, published on the front page of LA PRENSA, to the effect the canal's security is in danger because of Panama's political and economic instability is merely a message from the White House to Noriega, and serves as a bridge for Noriega to seek a solution, a solution that exists.

As it so happens, what Blandon has said is true. We must admit that Blandon is saying many things that are true. What happens is that Noriega is a prisoner of power. He is his own prisoner, a prisoner of his unlimited ambition, of his drug-trafficking network, of his network of conspirators, of the problem of the killing of Hugo Spadafora—that is why I say he is a prisoner. These other officers are truly afraid that if Noriega retires, they will be sought by the justice authorities. Noriega also fears—and this is where I emphasize the long arm of the DEA and the long arm of the Medellin cartel.... [does not complete sentence] It is presumed, according to testimony that have been given before the Senate, it is presumed that the laboratory discovered in the Darien jungles had Noriega's approval, and that he had been paid for his approval through former Colonel Julian Melo, who was also a victim of drug trafficking and was expelled.

However, according to reports, Noriega violated the agreement to protect the laboratory—an agreement he had reached with the Ochoas. Those things are hanging over Noriega's head. He knows that where he is the safest is right there, where he is abusing the FDP and the position that was assigned to him by the Republic.

Besides this, there is also the fact that this Republic has never wanted to have a man in the presidential house, because we do not have a president. We cannot say we have a president, because there is none. We have a man there who does not act; he does not act because he does not have what it takes. He should have removed them [not further identified] and requested their temporary dismissal to have them undergo an investigation. I will conclude with this idea, Mrs Correa: This case is so serious that it will only get worse. Noriega is going to continue to make mistakes. He is going to get desperate, and there may even be bloodshed. And, as I told THE WASHINGTON TIMES, even my own (?life is at stake). I am not exempt from this, but I am not going to turn tail. I am not going to run, regardless of danger to myself. So why these extremes?

It would appear to be reasonable that the Human Rights Commission installed in Panama—I believe it includes Eduardo Vallarino and Dr Velasquez—should make the necessary efforts before the OAS, the Human Rights Commission at the OAS, to take advantage of the opportunity of the fact that the OAS has just come out against or blames the Panamanian Government or the Defense Forces for the killing of Spadafora. Then, taking advantage of the uneasiness that must prevail in the OAS, the Human Rights Commission should denounce the violations of human rights here. Anything can happen here in the coming weeks, especially if what Minister of Planning Ricaurte Vasquez stated about the massive dismissal of public employees takes place. We will have street demonstrations and disorder, and herein lies the danger of bloodshed.

Therefore, I believe it is important to denounce the situation in Panama in order to make the respective OAS commission act, and perhaps even take strong measures. I checked on this, and I have been told it is very unlikely that the UN Security Council will agree to come and see what is happening in Panama.

I will avail myself of this opportunity now, and I will also put it in writing, I will do so in writing, that the gentlemen who fought alongside Torrijos, alongside all of us, all Panamanians, to secure the Torrijos-Carter Treaties—which are in danger, and it is true they are in danger.... [does not complete sentence] What the Torrijos-Carter Treaties defend is the persistence of a true democracy here, so that the rest of the world can respect us for exercising a true democracy. What most weakens security, or the guarantee that the canal reverts to Panama—as is everyone's wish—is this political instability and this very unpleasant and unfortunate example that we are giving the universe and humanity, when the chief of the Defense Forces is also a kingpin in drug trafficking.

The people are unarmed; in addition to being peaceful people, they are unarmed. We cannot get rid of him because he controls the only armed institution on the basis of fear, on the basis of pressure, and on the basis of terror. Therefore, it is a problem that is very difficult to solve.

I believe those same Latin American and European leaders—for example, former President Jimmy Carter; Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez; Carlos Andres Perez, who is again a presidential candidate in Venezuela; former Costa Rican Presidents Oduber and Carazo; present Costa Rican President Oscar Arias; [former Colombian President] Lopez Michelsen; and Perez Esquivel, the Argentine winner of the Nobel Peace Prize—should agree on an on-site inspection visit to Panama to see what is happening here: the violation of human rights, the denial of the Panamanian people's right to their own democracy, and the immoral struggle to prevent a change in the Electoral Tribunal, although that is elementary.

I reiterate that Mrs Yolanda de Pulice—as a lady she deserves all my respect; as a mother and wife she deserves all my respect—is an intelligent woman, and she knows she has lost public faith; she has lost prestige because of the Diaz Herrera case; she has been named as having participated in and having arranged the fraud. This has been said not only by Col Diaz Herrera, retired, but also by someone who everyone here respects: Dr Cesar Quintero, who was president of the Electoral Tribunal and who refused to endorse the credentials of Dr Nicolas Ardito Barletta. He made it very clear that there had been a fraud. We have heard Mr Murgas say the same thing. [passage omitted]

It has been repeated many times that Gen Noriega was part of the Blandon plan—Gen Noriega himself—as was Mr Delvalle. He had begun to implement the plan when he made statements to THE WASHINGTON TIMES, which he later retracted because Noriega also retreated many kilometers backward—not a step back, but kilometers back—due to the pressure of a small group of officers who Noriega unfortunately has corrupted.

I left him a healthy institution, a healthy institution. [repeats himself] I left him a chain of command that was composed of professionals: The colonel respected the general; the lieutenant colonel respected the colonel; the major respected the lieutenant colonel; and so forth. A colonel now cannot give orders to certain majors—such as those who appear in today's newspaper—because they will not obey him unless Noriega gives the order. Therefore, they have prostituted the chain of command, which is so sacred in a military institution. I did not leave a single politician imprisoned. I did not leave this country with any man in exile, while we still have three Panamanians fleeing abroad in the United States: Lewis Galindo, Eisenmann, and Sanchez Borbon. Everyone was free. It is inconceivable what they did with Victor Martinez Blanco; they do not even let him work due to their persecution. The owner of that radio station does not dare give him any work, a man who is a star. [passage omitted]

Since this is the baseball season, Mrs Correa, I want to conclude by telling the Panamanian people that they are going to have to win or lose their own game. The Panamanian people are going to have to step up to the pitcher's mound and throw for nine innings, and they must be the ones who win or lose with the final out. Many politicians are not truly interested in the real root of the problem; they are only interested in becoming legislators. Others want to be mayors, and the problem at the core can remain as is; it does not matter if Noriega remains and the sugar puppet [reference to Delvalle] remains. By the way, I found out yesterday that the most expensive sugar in America is right here, and the owners are Delvalle and Mr Chiari. The most expensive sugar in America is that paid here at 32 cents a pound. Everyone should know this.

Those gentlemen should leave. Mr Delvalle's time has expired. We have to get rid of him through an election. However, if the rules of the game, a game that the people must win, are not guaranteed; if the people are not guaranteed a new electoral tribunal with honest, reputable, and upright members—such as Victor Cruz Urrutia, whom people greet with respect because he is such a great man—then I tell the people that they should not be taken to that political scaffold, to have the guillotine fall on their heads. [passage omitted]

I am not calling for a revolution, but the people should demonstrate their firmness and dignity. If I am speaking out constantly through the communications media, it is because I know there is fear; I know there is fear. [repeats himself] There is fear, and I am trying to break the barrier of fear and intimidation. We Panamanians must not live with fear; that is something else I did not bequeath: fear or intimidation. Today there is fear and intimidation, but the country cannot continue in these conditions. Is there anything else, Mrs Correa?

[Correa] No, General; we have used the time of Legislator Mario J. Obaldia, but it was worth it, because we wanted to listen to you. Unfortunately, we do not have more time, but as circumstances allow, if you want to speak tomorrow, we will gladly offer the microphone of Radio Continente, which has sacrificed everything to take the truth to the people.

[Paredes] I thank you for the opportunity for this time, and I also apologize to Legislator Mario J. Obaldia. However, it is important to save ourselves; it is important to be very aware that there is a crisis that is very difficult to solve, virtually impossible to solve, very difficult to solve. But together, we can all reach a solution. Let it not be that things such as.... [does not complete sentence] Allow me 1 more minute. If Blandon says anything that provides corrections, suggests returning to or reestablishing a democracy here, or provides Gen Noriega with a way out—if someone does not like Blandon, they really gang up on him to prevent him from showing his face. If sometimes I say something, they gang up on me so that I will not show my face. Therefore, if everyone makes an effort, and we set aside vested interests, we will solve the problems. However, if someone is rowing forward and someone else is rowing backward, we will not get anywhere. Thank you, Mrs Mayin Correa; I will see you again.

[Correa] Thank you very much.

Arias Calderon on Need for New Army Leader

PA050249 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0000 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] Panama City, 4 Feb (ACAN-EFE) Ricardo Arias Calderon, president of the Panamanian opposition Christian Democratic Party, has expressed the urgent need to appoint a head of the Army. Arias Calderon made this statement after learning of the indictment of General Manuel Antonio Noriega today.

The chief of the Panama Defense Forces was formally indicted today by a Miami grand jury on charges of extortion and numerous illegal activities that are related to drug trafficking.

"Those professional military men who are not involved in the crimes of which Noriega is accused" must act "rapidly with patriotism," to create a new Army leadership in this country, Arias Calderon told ACAN-EFE upon learning the news.

"Each day there is more evidence—in this case, coming from a trustworthy judicial system—to point to the fact that the government has fallen into the hands of a criminal, to the disgrace of the Panamanian people," the opposition leader said.

Arias Calderon stated that he thought the difficulty in achieving democracy in Panama was primarily due to "the control of the military leadership over the political system."

He added, however: "It has now been discovered that the problem is even more serious. A criminal group controls the military institution and is abusing it to control Panamanian politics."

"Panamanians are shocked by this reality, and this reality makes a change in the military leadership more urgent," Arias Calderon added.

Sources from the public relations office of the Panama Defense Forces who were questioned on this matter stated that no official communique had yet been issued on this issue.

Members of the National Executive Committee of the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) were not at the party headquarters when ACAN-EFE sought their reaction to this news.

Argentina

Cooperation Agreement With Spain Signed

PY042033 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish GMT 1 Feb 88

[Text] Madrid, 1 Feb (TELAM special correspondent)—Presidents [as received] Raul Alfonsin and Felipe Gonzalez today signed the political document that establishes the basis for the General Cooperation and Friendship Treaty between Spain and Argentina, which calls for the development of a joint integrated program that will mobilize $3 billion over the next 5 years.

The protocol was signed this morning (1100 local time, 0700 Argentine time) at a ceremony in the El Prado Palace, and it provides for cooperation in five areas: political, economic, scientific-technical, cultural, and consular.

The text of the protocol follows:

Political Cooperation [subhead]

The two presidents have with satisfaction reached complete agreement on essential points of principle, such as:

The need in both countries to coexist in democracy, the only political way in which to respond to the people's ethical and social aspirations.

A commitment to the defense of human rights within a state of law.

The advisability of stimulating economic development as one of the conditions essential to consolidating a democratic system with freedom.

Awareness of the problem the foreign debt poses to the development of the Ibero-American people.

The importance of and need for a decisive renewed effort for the integration of Latin America.

The conviction that the entry of Spain into the European Community, a process that was always supported by Argentina, will contribute to intensifying relations between Europe and Ibero-America.

Firm condemnation of all actions contrary to the democratic regime established by the popular will in both countries, and repudiation of violence, authoritarianism, and intolerance.

The treaty will also provide for a system of high-level political consultations to seek reconciliation of the two countries' position, as well as reconciliation measures and attitudes adopted by the two countries to defend and enact these principles.

Economic Cooperation [subhead]

The treaty will establish a framework for economic cooperation between Spain and Argentina as democratic countries, a cooperation going beyond the traditional pattern between the two countries, without detriment to the international commitments of either country.

Also, the Spanish Government will encourage Spanish investments in the program of capitalization of the Argentine foreign debt.

That participation will be sought through the establishment and joint development of an integrated program for the economic take-off of Argentina. The main objective will be to promote the harmonious growth of Argentine industry, with the active participation of the private sectors of both countries.

The creation of associations between Spanish and Argentine enterprises will be promoted in order to assist the modernization of the Argentine production apparatus, with an eye toward increasing its effectiveness, competitiveness, and export capacity.

The development of the joint integrated program will involve a commitment of approximately $3 billion in funds for the 1988-92 period. The program's fundamental components will include: Spain's financial support, direct investments by Spanish companies in Argentina, and Argentine direct investments.

In general, the projects chosen are expected to have a positive effect on the Argentine economic structure and to generate foreign exchange and ability to pay through exports.

Under the integrated program, both countries will coordinate actions to promote the conversion of Argentina's debt with Spain into direct investments through the systems of foreign debt capitalization established in accordance with legislation in force in both countries.

Scientific-Technical Cooperation [subhead]

The treaty will reflect the importance of cooperation as a necessary precondition for the joint and individual development of the two countries.

Consequently, the actions to be undertaken must be supplemented by the exchange of experiences and professionals, the training of human resources, the transfer of technology, and the standarization of patterns and systems in the areas of economic cooperation.

The following are the priority areas:

The promotion of business relations, particularly at the level of small and medium-sized companies. This area will be promoted through the exchange of information, meetings, seminars, and training activities aimed at creating a special field of relations between companies of the two countries.

The strengthening of local development capacity as a factor for consolidating democracy. The objective of this area will be to share the experiences that the two countries have at various levels in their domestic administration, with a view toward promoting self-generated regional development.

The central administrations of the two countries will be supported in the areas of public works and infrastructure, through the sponsoring of personnel training for the development of new civil works technology.

The governments of the two countries will promise to increase their support for the existing research institutions or centers dealing with socioeconomic development, without precluding the coordination between this and other initiatives undertaken in Ibero-America with similar objectives, within the framework of the 5th centennial program.

Cultural Cooperation [subhead]

The treaty will reaffirm the importance of cultural cooperation, giving priority to the following:

A substantial increase in the number of scholarships and in aid for research.

The design and implementation of a program of joint activities and research projects on topics of common interest to be channeled through the universities, the research centers, and the libraries of the two countries.

The cultural cooperation that is under way under the auspices of the appropriate cultural institutions in Spain and Argentina will be intensified, creating, if necessary, new cultural centers in the cities of the two countries.

The historical-artistic heritage of common interest for Spain and Argentina will receive particular attention, and programs will be formulated for the revitalization of historical areas and the restoration of buildings.

Extensive facilities will be granted for the operation of institutions of learning that offer courses useful and applicable to both countries.

In view of the proximity of the commemoration of the 5th centennial of the discovery of America ("a meeting between two worlds") the cooperation between the Spanish national commission and the [words indistinct] commission will be promoted [words indistinct] of an Ibero-American cultural integration system.

Consular Cooperation [subhead]

With a view toward promoting integration and the mutual participation of their citizens in each nation, and with a view toward obtaining more assistance from third countries, the treaty will establish closer cooperation between the Spanish and Argentine consular services.

In this regard, the treaty will establish the cases in which, in keeping with the procedures to be determined by the treaties and with respective constitutional systems. [sentence as received; probably includes drop]

The citizens of each country will be granted the right to vote in the municipal elections in Spain and Argentina.

The scope of the existing bilateral treaties will be broadened and deepened in the area of judicial and consular cooperation and in the area of coordination of their respective legal systems.

Without precluding the system of consultations established in the area of political cooperation, an organization will be established by the treaty. The organization, which will be presided over by the respective foreign ministers, will examine the implementation of the treaty, the document says in conclusion.

Jaunarena Comments on Military Situation

PY042233 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1150 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Buenos Aires, 4 Feb (NA)—Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena has said there has been "no request" for amnesty from Army Chief General Jose Dante Caridi and that Jaunarena is willing to be questioned by the opposition bloc of the Chamber of Deputies.

Jaunarena pointed out that "there has been absolutely no" request or demand from Caridi for a government political decision related to the consequences of the war against subversion.

Asked if he admitted "some mistakes" in his administration as head of the Defense Ministry as a result of the Holy Week mutiny last year and the uprising last January, Jaunarena said: "This is not the time to make an evaluation of my administration, but I can probably make mistakes just like anybody else."

Jaunarena, who was accompanied by Defense Secretary Raul Alconada Sempe, talked to the press yesterday after he gave an extensive 4-hour report to the deputies of the UCR on the military crisis and Defense Ministry policies.

Early last night, after Jaunarena left the Chamber of Deputies, the UCR bloc discussed a political decision whether it would accept a request by the opposition bloc to question Jaunarena.

Regarding the request for questioning by the opposition, Jaunarena said: "I have fought for democracy since I was a child; therefore, it is an honor to appear in Congress."

Jaunarena explained that Deputy Maria Julia Alsogaray of the Centrist Democratic Union, one of the deputies requesting to question the minister, had all the information she requested on the Monte Caseros event within 48

hours of the uprising. He added: "Peronist Deputy Miguel Angel Toma and Hernan Patino Mayer, adviser of Antonio Cafiero, also received that information."

Jaunarena also said the trial of the military men "could last more than 30 days" in the military court, which he believes is the right place for them because the trials are "faster." However, he pointed out that all decisions can be appealed to the Federal Appellate Court.

Jaunarena played down a question about the position of Buenos Aires Province Deputy Leopoldo Moreau, who upon learning that Rico was in Monte Caseros, said he was opposed to Jaunarena remaining in his job. In this regard Jaunarena said: "That report is the responsibility of the person who said it, but Deputy Moreau attended the meeting with the UCR bloc and listened to my report."

Jaunarena also said: "An investigation is being conducted regarding possible links between the military group headed by Rico in the Army and the one headed by Colonel Fernando Estrella of the Air Force." However, he explained that no evidence has been found, and the rebels of the Air Force "took advantage" of the mutiny to take over the Aeroparque Metropolitan Airport.

Jaunarena pointed out that the situation in the Army is "completely normal" but admitted his concern over "delays" in paying the salaries of military personnel.

Regarding the situation of Captain Alfredo Astiz, he said that after President Raul Alfonsin gave instructions to the Navy General Staff for Astiz' retirement, "the Navy is conducting the necessary actions in this regard" but he did not elaborate.

Some deputies indicated that during the meeting, Jaunarena also discussed the delay in the approval of the defense draft law by the Senate. The deputies also made it clear that "there will be no changes" in the bill already approved by the deputies.

Alfonsin Orders 'Drastic' Spending Cut

PY041555 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2357 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Buenos Aires, 3 Feb (NA)—President Raul Alfonsin today instructed Economy Minister Juan Sourrouille to implement "a drastic reduction in public spending" in the national budget for 1988.

This information was released by Presidential Spokesman Jose Ignacio Lopez tonight, when reporting on a meeting that Alfonsin held with Sourrouille and Finance Secretary Mario Brodersohn at the Olivos residence today.

Lopez said the meeting marks the resumption of the contacts Alfonsin began with ministers and other government officials before his recent trip to Spain.

Lopez denied that the meeting had any thing to do with the negotiations with the IMF and the other foreign creditors, negotiations which have reportedly encountered difficulties in the effort to find a new accord.

"The objective of the meeting was to analyze the budget for 1988, and the president insisted on the need to drastically reduce public spending," Lopez said.

Natural Gas, Electricity Prices Increased

PY040037 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 2241 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Buenos Aires, 3 Feb (TELAM)—The Energy Secretariat has reported that natural gas and electricity prices were increased 11 percent as of today.

The report indicates that the increase applies to all categories.

450,000 Tons of Wheat Sold To Soviet Union

PY031752 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] Argentina has sold 450,000 tons of wheat from the 1988 harvest to the Soviet Union. This sale was made a few days ago through private exporters and the wheat will be shipped this month.

Nestor Niell, president of the national Grain Board, has said that we are not producing enough to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the international market. He added that Argentina has already sold 5 million tons of wheat from the 1988 harvest and has only 500,000 tons left to sell.

Briefs

Army Corps Changes Name

Cordoba, 27 Jan (TELAM)—The III Army Corps today issued a communique announcing that as of now it will be called III Army Corps-Northern Army [Cuerpo de Ejercito III, Ejercito del Norte] in tribute to all those who fought for our fatherland in that region. Jujuy, Salta, Tucuma, Catamarca, La Rioja, Santiago del Estero, and Cordoba Provinces fall under this corps' jurisdiction. [Summary] *[Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1600 GMT 27 Jan 88 PY]*

Brazil

Sarney Terms Debt Moratorium 'Greatest Error'

PY041431 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 3 Feb 88 p 17

[Excerpt] The U.S. Treasury has decided to support the Brazilian foreign debt negotiation, the terms of which will be definitely settled in 4 to 6 weeks. This was announced by Finance Minister Mailson da Nobrega at the ministerial meeting held on Monday at the Planalto Palace. The discussion on the foreign debt took up most of the meeting and it elicited an acknowledgement of error from President Sarney, who said that "the moratorium on the foreign debt was the greatest error we have committed."

The president voiced his feelings after a long statement by Minister Nobrega, who briefed those attending the meeting on the problems the moratorium caused the country. The finance minister said that it hurt the country both from the technical standpoint, because of the greater spreads (risk added rate) it had to pay, mainly on short-term lines of credit, and from the political standpoint, because the measure badly discredited the government before the international financial comunity, "damaging" the image of the country as a good payer.

Nevertheless, Minister Nobrega expressed great optimism with regard to the prospects for negotiating the foreign debt with private creditors and official organizations.

Nobrega Says Economy at 'Bottom of Barrel'

PY041319 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 3 Feb 88 p 1

[Text] The economy has reached the "bottom of the barrel" and if no incentive is given to investment and foreign capital is not attracted, there will be a "brutal recession" within 6 months This is what Mailson da Nobrega told the presidents of the metalworkers unions. Luis Antonio Medeiros, of the Sao Paulo Metalworkers Union, agrees, but he believes that the "bottom of the barrel" might cave in.

Central Bank Resolution on Debt Conversion

PY032035 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 2 Feb 88 p 37

["Text" of Central Bank Resolution on foreign debt conversion into risk capital, issued in Brasilia on 1 February]

[Text] Under the provisions of Article 9 of Law 4595 of 31 December 1964, the Central Bank of Brazil announces that the National Monetary Council, in a session held on 27 January 1988, taking into account the provisions of Article 4, Items V and XXXI, and Article 57 of the aforementioned law, and Article 50 of Decree 55762 of 17 February 1965, and observing the existing legal norms on foreign investments in the country,

Resolved:

I. To approve the attached regulation for the conversion of credits subject to agreements for restructuring the Brazilian foreign debt into investments in the country.

II. The Central Bank will issue the supplementary rules and adopt the measures necessary for the implementation of this resolution.

III. This resolution will go into effect on the date of its publication, revoking Resolution 1416 of 17 November 1987, as well as provisions contrary to the resolution.

[Dated] Brasilia (FD), 1 February 1988

[Signed] Wadico Waldir Bucchi, acting president

Regulation attached to Resolution 1460 of 1 February 1988, which is to govern the conversion of credits subject to agreements for restructuring the Brazilian foreign debt into investments in the country.

Chapter I [subhead]

On Foreign Credit Conversion [subhead]

Article 1. Under the terms of this regulation, the credits subject to agreement for restructuring the Brazilian foreign debt can be converted into investments if they are related to:

I. Medium- and long-term obligations (loans and financing) registered at the Central Bank of Brazil, and related obligations;

II. Deposits in foreign currency made in the Central Bank of Brazil related to the overdue portion of principal and the respective obligations; and

III. Deposits in foreign currency made in the Central Bank of Brazil under provisions of Item I of Resolution 1263 of 20 February 1987, and the respective obligations.

Single paragraph. The credits mentioned in this article can be converted into investments, whether rights over them have been transferred abroad or whether the corresponding obligations in the country have been transferred.

Chapter II [subhead]

On Conversions Subject to Auction [subhead]

Article 2. The conversion into investment of credits contractually owed by the Central Bank of Brazil or of foreign currency deposited in it (Items II and III of Article 1) will be made through auctions at the stock exchange.

Paragraph 1. To that effect, the Central Bank of Brazil will periodically establish two conversion ceilings, one of them for projects to be implemented in the areas of SUDENE [Northeast Development Superintendence], SUDAM [Amazonas Development Superintendence], Espirito Santo State, and the Jequitinhonha River valley, the execution of which will be supervised by the competent regional agencies.

Paragraph 2. The sum allocated for auctions intended for investments in areas of SUDENE, SUDAM, Espirito Santo State, and Jequitinhonha River valley will correspond to 50 percent of the total amount allocated for auctions, passing on any remaining amount to the next auction.

Article 3. The conversion of credits contractually owed by the Central Bank of Brazil or of foreign currency deposited in it (Items I and II of Article 1) for payment of loans covered by Notice MF-30 of 29 August 1983 and its amendments, or of medium- and long-term credits registered at the Central Bank for which public agencies are responsible, will be exempted from the auction system when they will be invested in agencies of the public sector.

Article 4. Resources resulting from conversions referred to in Article 2 can only be applied to:

I. Integration of capital of new enterprises or increase of existing enterprises;

II. Subscription of shares in the Foreign Capital Conversion Fund.

Chapter III [subhead]

On Public and Private Sector Debt [subhead]

Section I [subhead]

On Public Sector Debt [subhead]

Article 5. The debt registered at the Central Bank of Brazil in the name of agencies of the public sector—union, state, Federal District, territories, municipalities, and respective self-managed agencies, public enterprises, mixed economy enterprises, foundations, and enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by them—as well as operations of debt transfer to those agencies mabe on the basis of Resolution 63 of 21 August 1987 can only be converted into investments in agencies of the public sector.

Single paragraph. Concerning the conversion of the debt of entities included in the direct administration of the state—the union, states, federal district, territories, and municipalities—the invested resources must be used for the payment of loans under Notice MF-30 of 29 August 1983 and its amendments, or for the meidum- and long-term foreign loans registered at the Central Bank of Brazil, which are also the responsibility of public entities.

Article 6. Converted debt to be invested in entities of the public sector will comply with existing legal and regulatory restrictions and limitations, and will require previous agreement from the Special Secretariat for Control of State Enterprises (SEST) and the Secretariat of the National Treasury (STN).

Section II [subhead]

On the Debt of the Private Sector [subhead]

Article 7. The debt registered at the Central Bank of Brazil in the name of enterprises or entities not included in Article 5 can be converted into investments in enterprises or entities of the private or public sector.

Section III [subhead]

On the Debt of the Private and Public Sectors [subhead]

On Voluntary Deposits in the Central Bank [subhead]

Article 8. The conversion of deposits set up in the Central Bank of Brazil covered by Note 230 of 29 August 1974 and Resolution 432 of 23 June 1977 will be subject to provisions in Articles 5, 6, and 7, as the case may be, as well as to the ceilings that will be periodically established by the Central Bank of Brazil, which will examine the respective proposals on a first-come, first- served basis.

Single paragraph. Conversions for investment in public entities for payment of credits covered by Notice MF-30 of 29 August 1983 and its amendments, or for payment of medium- and long-term foreign credits registered at the Central Bank of Brasil, for which those entities are also liable, are exempted from the ceilings mentioned in the article above.

Chapter IV [subhead]

On the Registration of Investments [subhead]

Article 9. The amounts invested as the result of conversions referred to in Article 2 will be equal to the amounts stated in the proposals that won the auctions and equal to the amounts registered.

Article 10. The registration of investments resulting from conversions referred to in Articles 3, 5, 7 and 8 will be equal to the face value of the converted obligations

after the deduction of a discount to be established by the Central Bank of Brazil, which, for that purpose, will take into account the results obtained in the auctions referred to in Article 2.

Single paragraph. The difference between the face value of the converted obligations and the value of the registered investment, that is, the discount mentioned in the article above, if capitalized, will be considered national capital.

Chapter V [subhead]

On the Conversion Fund—Foreign Capital [subhead]

Article 11. The resources resulting from conversions, excepting those resulting from public sector debts referred to in Article 5, can also be invested in securities through the "Conversion Fund—Foreign Capital," by observing the following rules:

I. Shares from the "Conversion Fund—Foreign Capital" will be registered and their transfer abroad will only be allowed in the form and periods the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) establishes.

II. The "Conversion Fund—Foreign Capital" will not be able to have in its portfolio more than 5 (five) percent of the voting capital, or 20 (twenty) percent of the total capital of any single enterprise.

III. Fiscal and foreign capital registration obligations will be those provided for in Law 4131 of 3 September 1962, applying likewise the provision in the Regulation—Annex II to Resolution 1289 of 20 March 1987, and any other regulation the CVM might establish in the future.

Chapter VI [subhead]

On Minimum Period for Repatriation [subhead]

Article 12. The minimum period for repatriation of converted resources will be 12 (twelve) years from the date of capitalization of such resources.

Chapter VII

On Remittances Abroad [subhead]

Article 13. The profits or dividends generated by conversions may be transferred abroad, provided the terms of Law 4131 of 3 September 1962 and the applicable fiscal legislations are duly complied with.

Article 14. Any capital return or dividend to be transferred by companies in which foreign capital owns part of the shares shall be subject to deposits at the Brazilian Central Bank, until such returns or dividends reach the amount of the investment resulting from the conversion operations described in this resolution. These deposits shall be held at the Central Bank of Brazil, under conditions that shall be established, until completion of the minimum period referred to in Article 12.

Chapter VIII [subhead]

On Restrictions [subhead]

Article 15. In all cases, the funds resulting from conversions shall be invested in risk operations only, and shall not be invested in operations resembling any type of credit operation.

Paragraph 1. Without precluding the terms of this article, the funds resulting from the conversion may be invested in infrastructure projects, as long as the public undertaking does not guarantee profitability and/or markets for the goods and services produced.

Paragraph 2. No conversion operation shall be authorized for projects that guarantee that the public sector will at any time repurchase the investment.

Article 16. Conversion operations resulting either directly or indirectly in the transfer of control of companies or organizations that are directly or indirectly controlled by individuals living in Brazil to individuals or corporations abroad shall not be authorized.

Article 17. No conversion operation shall be authorized if the participants in the operation or persons who report to them have transferred funds abroad as either capital return or dividends within 36 (thirty-six) months immediately prior to the date on which the request for conversion is submitted to the Brazilian Central Bank.

Single paragraph. This restriction shall not apply if the amounts that were transferred abroad during the abovementioned period are returned to the country.

Article 18. Participants in conversions or individuals who report to them may not invest the funds resulting from the conversions for partial or total purchase of foreign investments during the minimum period referred to in Article 12, unless the proceeds from such purchases are reinvested in the country, in compliance with the terms of this resolution.

Chapter IX [subhead]

General and Transitory Regulations [subhead]

Article 19. Funds involved in conversion operations that have already been authorized may be deposited at the Brazilian Central Bank under the conditions that shall be established by the Brazilian Central Bank.

Article 20. The proposals for conversion that were submitted to the Brazilian Central Bank before 20 July 1987 shall remain subject to the terms of Note 1125 of 9 November 1984, and the following deadlines shall apply as of the date of approval of this resolution:

I. The participants in the conversion shall confirm the operation and comply with the conditions established by the Brazilian Central Bank within 30 (thirty) days.

II. The Brazilian Central Bank shall make a conclusive decision on the requests for conversion within 60 (sixty) days.

III. The funds required for the conversion referred to in the first clause of this article shall be deposited within 180 (one hundred and eighty) days.

Paragraph 1. The deposits referred to in section III of this article may be withdrawn in keeping with the chronological order of presentation of the requests, and with the monthly ceilings that shall be established by the Brazilian Central Bank.

Paragraph 2. Without precluding the terms of Paragraph 1, the Central Bank of Brazil will set the time [within the 180-day period] to make the deposits, upon expiration of which the right to transact the conversion operation will be automatically cancelled.

Minister Signs Decree on Satellite Use

PY271345 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 27 Jan 88

[Text] Communications Minister Antonio Carlos Magalhaes has signed a decree on the use of the Brazilian Satellite Telecommunications System in rural telecommunications programs. The decree encourages the manufacture of Brazilian-made small ground stations.

After being installed as president of the Brazilian Foundation of Educational Television [FUNTEVE] by Education Minister Hugo Napoleao, journalist Antonio Frota Netto said his intention is to expand television journalism within FUNTEVE because it is a very important cultural and educational endeavor that helps national integration.

Frota Netto said he intends to continue the radio and television policy developed by FUNTEVE. According to Frota Netto, former FUNTEVE President Roberto Parreira's work has yielded very good results at the national level.

Communist Party Threatens Dissidents

PY020158 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 31 Jan 88 p 5

[By Anselmo de Souza]

(Excerpt] The political terrorism and fascist methods being used by the board of the PC do B against former members who disagree with the central command are frightening young people who have participated in party activities, and young people who want to leave the party ranks. These people are subjected to "torture sessions," and even after leaving the party they receive death threats. "You will still be shot," a communist woman shouted at a dissident. As a result, the two young women, both student leaders, ended up coming to blows at the Tiete bus station in Sao Paulo.

The disagreements within the party increased after O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO published an article on 20 December 1987 in which former political prisoner Amelinha Teles charged party leaders with making agreements with the government to maintain their public service jobs. The article, which was entitled "Accusation—There Is a Mafia in the PC do B Leadership," disclosed cases of vengeance against people who dared to disagree with the party's official line. It also revealed the public service jobs held by several communist leaders in diferent states.

Young dissidents—college students—have revealed that the same tactics are used to maintain control over student organizations. Within this framework, the PC do B took over the Socialist Youth Union (UJS), a non-party organization created in 1984. A group of Rio de Janeiro dissidents of the PC do B intends to present these charges today at the yearly PC do B congress to be held in Petropolis (Rio de Janeiro State). The meeting, which will be attended by some 1,000 youths from all over the country, is chaired by Apolinario Rebelo, a Sao Paulo communist leader and the UJS coordinator general. The communists, however, have tried to prevent the presentation of charges by threatening the young leaders before the start of the congress. [passage omitted]

Briefs

GDP Growth Statistics

The GDP grew 3.6 percent in 1987 in comparison to 1986. In 1986 the GDP grew 8.2 percent in relation to 1985. These figures were announced by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. [Text] *[Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 28 Jan 88 PY]*

Chile

Government Denies Free Elections Possible

PY021814 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Text] In connection with a report published by a Santiago morning newspaper, that the government might be considering the possibility of calling for free elections, the Ministry of Interior has issued a communique stating that the government will continue along the institutional course established in the Constitution, and that any speculation in this regard is totally groundless. When asked about this issue, Mininster of Interior Sergio Fernandez mentioned the communique and thus clarified the remarks by political leader Juan Eduardo King, who said that the government may be analyzing the possibility of amending the Constitution to call for free elections instead of the plebiscite.

13 Parties Agree on Negative Plebiscite Vote

PY022340 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Text] During a meeting at the Tupahue Hotel a few minutes ago, 13 opposition political parties officially announced they had agreed to give a negative answer to the upcoming plebiscite. They added that only in this manner will it be possible to defeat the fraud and hold free elections. The meeting was attended by leaders and followers of the 13 parties, who called the decision one of the most important steps of the past 15 years, in that it announced to Pinochet their determination to strive to end his regime and for the restoration of democracy. Part of the document, which was read by an announcer, states:

As of now we pledge our joint political determination to carry out a popular mobilization campaign designed to achieve the broadest participation of all Chilean sectors, to make certain that the no vote will win.

At the same time, we warn that if, according to our joint evaluation, the electoral process does not include the minimum requirements to be an open process, we will reject it. This evaluation will focus mainly on the number of persons registered with the electoral courts; the possibility of exercising effective democratic control—from the operational point of view—over the casting of votes and the vote count; the free exercise of public liberties; the lifting of goverment intervention; the end of intimidation of the people, especially concerning job security for public and municipal servants, mainly in the rural areas; equal access to the media, especially television; and a real chance to carry out campaigns in favor of the no vote.

We are convinced this will be adequate to counteract the overwhelming publicity and the unbridled pressure exerted by the government. Moreover, we will establish a democratic surveillance and control system over the plebiscite, including the casting of votes and vote counting. These, in addition to the mobilization we will carry out, will allow us to confront attempts to intimidate those who vote no.

Further on, the document explains in five points what voting no during the plebiscite will mean:

We hereby inform the country that by voting no, the people will defeat Pinochet, the regime, and its institutional itinerary, in addition to granting support to the following proposal:

Free elections for the president of the Republic as soon as possible—including a run-off election mechanism—for a 4-year term, as well as the election of a national congress that will enjoy constitutional powers and will be entirely elected by popular suffrage.

Support for the agreements reached concerning human rights, the safeguarding of justice, and the full enforcement of the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Treaty for Civilian and Political Rights.

Replacement of the current law on political parties by an alternative text that is in keeping with the principles contained in the draft law that has already been drawn up by the study group on constitutional matters.

Derogation of all measures that proscribe ideologies or prevent the full exercise of the people's sovereignty, and their replacement with measures that safeguard respect for the basic principles of any democracy; that is, the periodic replacement of governing officials by the people, succession in government, human rights, the enforcement of the rejection of violence and its causes, respect for minority rights, an end to exile, and the restitution of nationality to those who have been deprived of it.

The document is signed by the Christian Democratic Party, the Socialist Party Almeyda faction, the Worker-Peasant United Popular Action Movement, the United Popular Action Movement, the Radical Party Silva Cimma faction, the Radical Party Luengo faction, the Christian Leftist Party, the Chilean Social Democratic Party, the Socialist Party Nunez faction, the National Democratic Party, the Humanist Party, the Popular Socialist Union, and the Republican Liberal Union.

Former Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda personally signed the document on behalf of the Socialist Party faction that he leads. The politician signed the document in the prison where he has been held for the past 7 months.

The ceremony ended with the signing of the national anthem and expressions of happiness by all who participated in reaching the important agreement.

Criticism of Platform Studied

PY022253 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Text] The government is annoyed at our platform because it points out the deficiencies of the regime, which does not have a government program. This was stated by Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic Party, in reply to criticism by Orlando Poblete, minister secretary general of government, of the platform the seven political parties presented a few days ago.

[Begin Aylwin recording] This is an extremist government struggling against another extreme. We repudiate all extremism. Our government platform is moderate because it avoids all extremes and because it seeks solutions by consensus. [end recording]

The government, Aylwin added, claims that our platform favors altering the institutional order established by the 1980 Constitution, and that the opposition is incapable of being constructive.

[Begin Aylwin recording] What news! We have always said that we wanted to alter the institutional order, because we want democracy. The system of government established by the 1980 Constitution is a system of presidential dictatorship with military protection, not a protected democracy, as the regime calls it. Its government system is not democratic. The congressional system it is preparing is not representative, because a considerable number of senators will be appointed by the government. This congress will have no authority. We have repeatedly declared that it will be a purely ornamental congress. [end recording]

Aylwin noted that the Constitution is inflexible. The only power that can counteract the unlimited power of the president is that of the National Security Council, which is authorized by the Constitution to veto a decision made by any official of the Republic. This National Security Council is largely composed of the commanders in chief of the Armed Forces and of the director general of the Carabineros. That is why, Alwyn added, we insist that this is really a regime of a presidential dictatorship protected by the military.

Socialist Leader on Army Talks

PY030204 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 2200 GMT 2 Feb 88

[Excerpts] Aniceto Rodriguez, a leader of one of the Socialist Party factions, admitted that the agreement of the 13 opposition political parties could become a starting point for establishing negotiations with the Armed Forces.

Rodriguez stated this in reply to a question concerning possible negotiations with the Armed Forces. Aniceto Rodriguez, along with Armando Jaramillo, is one of the politicians responsible for uniting the opposition—except for the PCCh and the Historical faction of the Socialist Party—in December 1987. [passage omitted]

Rodriguez' statements will certainly annoy other opposition leaders, particularly those who say that no talks should be held with the Armed Forces, and that the opposition parties should completely break away from the government.

Following the meeting in the Tupahue Hotel, Christian Democratic Party leader Patricio Aylwin noted that no more talks about candidates, precandidates, or [words indistinct]. This completely discourages the party and personal aspirations of politicians who had hoped to be candidates. Examples of these people are (Mario Tapi) and Eugenio Velazco for the Social Democratic Party; Valdez, Saldivar, and Molina for the Christian Democratic Party, since Frei gave up; and others who—as a National Party youth leader said—egotistically seek a candidacy.

MIR on Opposition Problems

PY032230 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 3 Feb 88

[Text] The agreement of the 13 opposition political parties is an illusion, one that disturbs the national scene. It is only an attempt to create an appropriate atmosphere to appoint a candidate to lead the no choice in the plebiscite. This was stated by Yegmar Neghme, MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] spokesman in the United Left [IU] coalition. Neghme was referring to yesterday's meeting of the political parties at the Tupahue Hotel.

The MIR leader also acknowledged that the IU is undergoing a deep crisis, and that it is practically paralyzed. He said there is an obvious split in the IU because three of its parties are about to openly reject the no option. Neghme then criticized the Christian Democratic Party [PDC] for its current policy, describing it as a toboggan policy [politica de tobogan].

Neghme stated that the political parties have abandoned their principles and have forgotten that in the past, they opposed the political parties law and the registration for elections, as well as advocating free elections. He added that the PDC's alternative government platform will fail hopelessly, and that the only thing the PDC intends to do with it is to initiate a dialogue with the Armed Forces, which is not feasible.

He also criticized the attitude of Socialist leader Aniceto Rodriguez and other politicians who favor an agreement with the Armed Forces. This could be another point of friction among the opposition members that will contribute to their disorganization

Group Denies Responsibility for Bomb Blast

PY041832 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] In a new anonymous call to Radio Chilena, an individual who claimed to be spokesman for a group known as the Nationalist Combat Force denied that this group participated in the incident at Villa Portales, where a bomb killed three people last Sunday [31 January]. This time the caller's voice was recorded.

The spokesman termed as false the report that the bomb blast which killed the three people was to revenge the attack in which Carabineros Major Julio Benimeli died. He added that the previous anonymous calls mentioned, quote, a Nationalist Combat Front, while the correct name is Nationalist Combat Force, unquote.

[Begin anonymous caller recording] This mistake leads us to the conclusion that the person who made the calls undoubtedly has nothing to do with our group and is therefore an impostor. [end recording]

The spokesman added that this is a propaganda operation of the Communist Party and its branches, which have advocated violence that aims at confusing the public. He said his group is certain that those who died in Villa Portales were actually MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] members, and that the bomb they were handling exploded.

Uruguay

ROC Releases Communique on Diplomatic Ties

PY041830 Montevideo Radio Carve in Spanish 0830 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The Uruguayan Government has recognized the PRC as the sole, legal Government of China. This clause is contained in the joint communique that was released by the Uruguayan and the PRC embassies at the United Nations.

Herewith is the text of the communique: The Governments of Uruguay and the PRC, in keeping with the common interests and wishes of the two peoples have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level as of 3 February.

The Uruguayan Government recognizes the PRC Government as the sole legal Government of China. The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Uruguayan Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.

The two governments have agreed to develop their friendly relationships on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial intergrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, a peaceful coexistence.

The two governments have agreed to exchange ambassadors within the shortest possible time and will provide each other with all the necessary assistance for the establishment and functioning of embassies in their respective capitals.

Taiwan has reacted as could be expected by protesting and labelling as unfriendly Uruguay's decision to establish relations with the PRC and released the following communique: In view of the publication of the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the PRC, the office of the press attache of the Embassy of the Republic of China, in accordance with instructions from its government, whishes to report that: 1) [numbering as heard] relations between the Republic of China and Uruguay have always developed in the framework of cordial friendship and that broad bilateral cooperation in the international field has been maintained at all times.

The Government of the Republic of China regrets the decision of the Uruguayan Government to establish diplomatic relations with the communist regime of continental China and at the same time states its vigorous protest for this extremely unfriendly decision which seriously damages the interests of the Republic of China.

The Republic of China has decided to suspend, as of 3 February, diplomatic relations with Uruguay. The communique adds that all consequences of this decision are the exclusive responsibility of the Uruguayan Government. It also says that the Uruguayan Government is asked to continue giving legal protection and fair treatment to the Chinese citizens who have to remain in Uruguay.

The Embassy of the Republic of China wishes to point out that the Uruguayan Government's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the communist regime of continental China, forcing the severance of relations between the Republic of China and Uruguay disregarding the years of friendship and the interests that have linked our two countries, is insulting and ungrateful. All the consequences of this decision will be on the exclusive responsibility of the Uruguayan Government.

The Government of the Republic of China states its vigorous protest for the Uruguayan decision and feels that it is compelled to close its embassy in Montevideo.

The Chinese Embassy in Montevideo conveys its gratitude to all those who for many years have given us their support and friendship, and states its firm conviction that the honorable Uruguayan people will maintain the

ties of sincere friendship with the government and the people of the Republic of China in the quest for common goals, prosperity, freedom, and democracy. It reiterates that the Uruguayan Government is solely responsible for this decision.

Dated: 3 February 1988

Briefs

Trade Balance Report

According to official sources, total Uruguayan exports reached $1,256,700,000 in 1987. This is 9.8 higher than the 1986 export figures. Since total imports reached $1,189,100,000 in 1987, the balance of trade showed a surplus of $67.6 million. [Summary] *[Montevideo LA HORA in Spanish 17 Jan 88 p E6 PY]*

Suriname

Arron on Restoring Relations With Netherlands

FL041940 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The Suriname Government wants to restore relations with Holland at the ambassadorial level as soon as possible.

Vice President Arron, who said this in the National Assembly yesterday, added however, that the relationship should be based on mutual respect, understanding, and recognition of each other's sovereignty.

Arron made his remarks in answer to questions by Assemblyman (?Rufus Nooitmeer), who is the leader of the Front team in the Assembly.

(Nooitmeer) has said that the current diplomatic relationship is not a correct one. He referred to the manifesto of the Front which speaks about the good connection to be made in the development cooperation between Suriname and Holland.

Foreign Minister Outlines Government Program

FL041951 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to be kept in line with the development goals of the government. This was stated by Foreign Affairs Minister (Seduck) when he met with his staff earlier this week. He told our newsroom that the government program will, among others, contain the push for a growth in the national product, strengthening of the economy, increased employment, and stability of balance of payments.

The minister added that development financing plays a substantial role in these aims. This means, said the minister, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will have to explore the traditional and other development sources, such as the International Development Bank, the European Development Fund, and relations with Holland, Brazil, French Guiana, and Guyana.

The minister further said that in the short term he will evaluate foreign diplomatic postings and their (?staff) and will also formulate guidelines for these diplomatic postings.

(Seduck) said that in executing his policy, he will not be working politically but rather like a technocrat, adding that all members of the ministry will be involved in the process.

Defense Ministry Appointment Criticized

FL041921 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] Yesterday, the National Assembly criticized a recent appointment in the civil service. A number of assemblymen criticized the appointment of a new director [Orlando Van Amson] in the Ministry of Defense and proposed that always an appointment be critically reviewed.

The Assembly was of the opinion that the new government should not be tied to last minute appointments made by the previous government.

There has been a 2-month transition period between the November 25th elections and the installation of the new government at the end of last month.

Last Three National Assembly Members Sworn In

FL041931 Paramaribo International Service in English 1730 GMT 4 Feb 88

[Text] The National Assembly will reach its full complement with the admittance of the last three members who were sworn in yesterday. They are (Sak Klayfair) of the National Democratic Party, (Ruben Citromiyoyo) and (Gerine Hudins), who both represent the Front for Democracy and Development.

Assembly Chairman Lachmon told the new members that the country has difficult times ahead and that the government needs both support and critical guidance.